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Chapter 14

EPILOGUE

The reason for VADM Kurita's withdrawal was never clearly explained by the admiral, even after intense interrogation by U.S. officials after the war had ended. When Centre Force broke off action with Taffy III and headed north to regroup, it was still considered a very potent force to be reckoned with. At this time Centre Force consisted of battleships YAMATO, KONGO, HARUNA, and NAGATO, heavy cruisers TONE and HAGURO, light cruisers NOSHIRO and YAHAGI, and at least six to eight destroyers. Vice Admiral Kurita's force was far from defeated and was more than capable of proceeding toward Leyte Gulf to complete its "one- way" mission. Unknown by VADM Kurita at the time, there was little along the way to stop him if he chose to do so.

If the remaining ships of Centre Force had continued their sortie toward Leyte Gulf, it would have been interesting to see how RADM Oldendorf's old battleships and Seventh Fleet surface forces would have dealt with them. As stated earlier, the Seventh Fleet supply of armor-piercing ammunition was nearly depleted after their action in Surigao Strait. Since the old battleships were at least five knots slower than those of Centre Force, a running fight was not desirable.

At the direction of VADM Kinkaid, RADM Oldendorf deployed three old battleships, five cruisers, and two destroyer squadrons twenty-five miles eastward of the northern entrance to Surigao Strait. The remaining forces belonging to the Seventh Fleet were kept well inside of Leyte Gulf. Whether these two groups could have effectively engaged and defeated the IJN Centre Force would never be known.

The Americans lost six warships at Leyte Gulf, almost 37,000 tons. Compared with the Japanese loss of 26 warships weighing over 306,000 tons, it was clearly an American victory. The Japanese loss figures are remarkable considering how ADM Halsey’s Third Fleet failed to adequately deal with Centre Force’s egress and return to San Bernardino Strait. The numbers most likely would had been much higher and perhaps one-sided, if ADM Halsey's Task Force 34 would have met Centre Force as it debauched from San Bernardino Strait at midnight on October 24th. The total tonnage of the twenty-three IJN Centre Force warships which transited through San Bernardino Strait at this time was about 318,000 tons. The match-up between Vice Admiral Kurita’s Centre Force and VADM Lee’s 16-inch gun fast-battleships of TF 34 in San Bernardino Strait would had made the action in Surigao Strait look modest.

Five of the six American warships sunk in the Battle of Leyte Gulf were from Task Unit 77.4.3 (Taffy III), four of which, were sunk directly by VADM Kurita's Centre Force gunfire. The costs in lives to Taffy III were 898 dead and 913 wounded. A large majority of these deaths occurred during the two days the crews of CVE GAMBIER BAY, DD JOHNSTON, DD HOEL, and DE ROBERTS tragically spent in the water awaiting rescue, another grave error committed by the American command. The two remaining American vessels, both carriers, CVE ST LO and CL PRINCETON, were sunk by separate kamikaze attacks.

The figures below do not include those ships damaged on both sides.

1 Light Carrier:
PRINCETON

2 Escort Carriers:
GAMBIER BAY & ST LO

2 Destroyers:
HOEL & JOHNSTON

1 Destroyer Escort:
SAMUEL B. ROBERTS

The Japanese lost twenty-six front line warships during the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

1 Fleet Carrier:
ZUIKAKU

3 Light Carriers:
ZUIHO, CHIYODA, & CHITOSE

1 18-inch Battleship:
MUSASHI

2 14-inch Battleships:
YAMASHIRO & FUSO

6 Heavy Cruisers:
ATAGO, MAYA, SUZUYA, CHOKAI, CHIKUMA, & MOGAMI

4 Light Cruisers:
NOSHIRO, ABUKUMA, TAMA, & KINU

9 Destroyers:
NOWAKI, HAYASHIMO, YAMAGUMO, ASAGUMO, MICHISHIO, AKITSUKI, HATSUTSUKI, WAKABA, & URANAMI

Vice Admiral Kurita's reasons for withdrawal no doubt must have been many. We can only speculate about what his concerns were which led to this decision. Here is what I believe he was faced with:

• The Japanese Southern Force Van’s unsuccessful sortie and their nearly total destruction and the Southern Force Rear's hasty retreat. As originally planned, VADM Kurita had expected to meet with these forces in Leyte Gulf and, just prior to meeting Taffy III, learned of their fate which obviously must have had been a great let down. The failure of VADM Nishimura and VADM Shima to coordinate their attack was disgraceful and leads one to speculate once again, what would have happened...
   
• Vice Admiral Kurita was told the enemy had requested aid from friendly forces by plain-language telephone (TBS) and in reply, it was stated help would arrive "...in about two hours....". More complications in the heat of battle caused by poor intelligence information.

• The sighting of Taffy II, with several more "fast carriers" and "BALTIMORE" Class heavy cruisers made VADM Kurita weary and made him reconsider what he was up against . . . . perhaps another powerful section of Third Fleet. He simply did not know how many carriers the Americans had. More complications caused by poor intelligence information.
   

• The sighting of a "PENNSYLVANIA" Class battleship mast. Although only an apparition, more complications caused by poor intelligence information and an exhausted mind.
   
• An unconfirmed report was received of another American carrier Task Group northeast of Samar. More complications caused by poor intelligence information.
   
• The vessels of Centre Force were low in fuel and needed to conserve their remaining supply. Although this was to be a one-way sortie to Leyte Gulf, "...without regard for any damage we may suffer...." it seems VADM Kurita was less than willing to let his entire force be destroyed while attempting to complete his mission.
   
• Centre Force needed time to transit back through San Bernardino Strait near sunset or during the night when the chance of an air attack was thought to be least likely. In addition, VADM Kurita felt he needed to put as much distance as he could between Centre Force and the Philippine Sea by morning so he would not repeat the same fate as he suffered the day before in the Sibuyan Sea (massed Third Fleet air attacks).

• Quite easily put,....San Bernardino Strait!
   
• The communications between Third and Seventh Fleets were very poor. This was the king pin of the American failures at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, particularly the messages between the admirals and their fleet commands regarding the safeguard of San Bernardino Strait.
   
• Admiral Halsey’s failure to form Task Force 34 on the night of 24 October and his subsequent unwillingness to leave it to guard San Bernardino Strait before heading north to engage the bait Northern Force.
   
• Once ADM Halsey decided to head northward to engage the Northern Force, he failed to initially split his forces to guard against all contingencies. After much rousing, he ultimately did divide his forces when it was too late and without results. This snafu became known as the "Battle of Bull’s Run."
   
• Vice Admiral Kinkaid should have been more aggressive in his reconnaissance of San Bernardino Strait, regardless of whether he thought Third Fleet was covering his northern approaches.

On paper, an American victory at Leyte Gulf was not difficult to imagine. The Americans held the advantage in all categories of warships except heavy cruisers. Carrier airpower was by then clearly the striking power of the fleet and therefore contributed significantly to the American victory at Leyte Gulf.

After the battle, Rear Admiral C.A.F. Sprague summed up his account of their ordeal stating: "...The Japanese gunnery was good as to mean range, poor as to advance range, and with excellent patterns. It is believed they had an airborne spotter overhead. The fact that a large number of shells were AP, non-explosive, resulted in much less damage from hits received. In summation, the failure of the enemy main body and encircling light forces to completely wipe out all vessels of this Task Unit can be attributed to our successful smoke screen, our torpedo counter-attack, continuous harassment of the enemy by bomb, torpedo, and strafing air attacks, timely maneuvers, and the definite partiality of Almighty God...."

When the Battle of Leyte Gulf was finished, the Imperial Japanese Combined Fleet could never again threaten the U.S. Navy as a capable offensive fighting force. With their sea lanes to their oil fields and raw materials in the southern region severed and their Navy soundly defeated, Japan would unconditionally surrender in less than one year.

The performance of the escort carrier group at Leyte Gulf, especially Taffy III, was nothing short of miraculous. One week after the engagement, RADM Thomas Sprague sent the following congratulations communique to his well deserving forces who fought at Leyte:

FROM: Commander Escort Carrier Group 77.4
ACTION: All ships and units under my command
DATE: 2 November 1944
INFO: COM7THFLT/
CINCPAC/
COMAIRPAC/
COMDESPAC/
COM3RDFLT/
COM5THFLT

To those officers and men of the escort carriers and to the kin of those who were lost X This task group has participated in one of the decisive battles of this war X The aircraft of these carriers not only have met and defeated enemy attacks in the air but they have turned back a large enemy fleet composed of his most modern ships X The intrepid courage, skill and fighting spirit of the pilots and air crewmen were superb X Never have fighting men had a greater task and never have fighting men performed their duty with greater determination and distinction X The seamanlike handling of the vessels X The brilliant offensive and defensive work of the screen X The sustained and imperturbable handling of planes on deck X The calm singleness of purpose of the rearming and gasoline details X The prompt and efficient action of the damage control parties and the engineers X All contributed to turning the tide of battle to victory X Against such teamwork the enemy could not prevail X I am proud to have been privileged to be present and observe your achievements X May God bless everyone of you and may the citizens of your country forever remember and be thankful for your courage X To the mothers, fathers, sisters and brothers, wives and sons and daughters of those who were lost I say X Do not be sad X Be comforted and inspired in the thought that the victory for which these men so freely and courageously gave their lives has contributed immeasurably to the final defeat of the enemy X T. L. SPRAGUE (Rear Admiral in charge of all CVEs on Leyte Invasion)

No matter how great the American superiority was at this point in the war it was still a very long way to final victory in the Pacific. As the Americans drew closer to the Japanese home islands it was only to become more fiercely contested by the cornered Japanese.

It was the Navy’s carrier air power that saved Taffy III from complete annihilation. Indeed, it was the aircraft of the sixteen escort carriers present that day aboard the taffies themselves that ultimately saved them. The bond between the men who manned the ships and the men of the composite squadrons is forever strong, each owing the other a great debt of gratitude for what occurred in the heat of battle. Quite rightfully, we shall never forget the sacrifices made by these gallant men, the warships, and their embarked composite squadrons who fought the Imperial Japanese Navy Centre Force so bravely and with high honor off Samar on October 25, 1944.

---

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