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his book has been edited to fit the internet.
The Battle Off Samar - Taffy III at
Leyte Gulf
SECOND EDITION
< Condensed Internet Version >
Copyright © 2001 Robert Jon Cox
All rights reserved
Ivy Alba Press, LLC
Chapter 2
THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET
The amphibious landings on Leyte were
orchestrated by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of all Pacific Forces and
VADM Thomas Kinkaid, Commander Seventh Fleet. They would be the most important
of the Pacific war to date. To support this crucial undertaking, the U.S.
Pacific Fleet, the most powerful fleet ever assembled, would support the
landings with every available ship.
Vice Admiral Kinkaid, embarked in his command
ship WASATCH, commanded 738 ships at Leyte Gulf. The vast armada included
every type of auxiliary, amphibious, and combatant ship in the U.S. inventory,
except the large fleet carriers.
Guarding the Leyte beachhead were the Northern
and Southern Fire Support Units, commanded by Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf and
RADM G. L. Weyler respectively. Their firepower came from five of the Pearl
Harbor battleship veterans: WEST VIRGINIA, TENNESSEE, CALIFORNIA,
MARYLAND, PENNSYLVANIA, and MISSISSIPPI.
The old battleships of Pearl Harbor were not sent
to Leyte Gulf to fight other warships. Indeed, because they were considered
nearly obsolete, they were sent to the invasion beach itself to conduct shore
bombardment. Since they were not expected to fight ship-to-ship engagements,
only three, WEST VIRGINIA, TENNESSEE, and CALIFORNIA, were
fitted with the latest Mark-8 gunnery fire control radar. The remaining three
old battleships, MISSISSIPPI, MARYLAND, and PENNSYLVANIA
retained the outmoded, inaccurate, Mark-3 gunnery fire control radar.
The remaining Seventh Fleet fighting assets
assigned to the Fire Support Units and other support roles were a bit more
impressive than the old battleships. They included three heavy cruisers, two
light cruisers, and nineteen destroyers, many new. This constituted a formidable
fighting force against any opponent.
Excluded from this force were the actual
amphibious forces of Seventh Fleet that brought the foot soldiers to Leyte.
Separated into two landing groups, Northern and Southern, they would disembark
the troops from the landing ships, liberty ships, and cargo transports. The
landing force also had its own screening ships, consisting of several cruisers
and many destroyers.
Embarked on the light cruiser NASHVILLE
was General Douglas MacArthur himself. He had kept his promise to the Filipinos,
when, thirty-one months earlier he had defiantly stated "...I shall
return...." And return he did; seventy to eighty thousand troops landed on
the first day of the invasion, October 20.
No modern fleet would be complete without air
power. Seventh Fleet’s punch came from one of the lesser known vessels
assigned to the fleet. They were the CVEs, or escort carriers. These were the
smallest of the American carriers that became well known for their extensive use
in the Atlantic ocean sinking German U-boats. In the Pacific Fleet, the escort
carrier was used for other roles than those available to its big brothers, the
large fleet carrier and light carrier. On any given day a CVE pilot might fly
Combat Air Patrol, bring water to thirsty army troops, hunt submarines, bomb
bridges, perform reconnaissance, or the ship itself be used in an auxiliary role
to ferry replacement aircraft to the larger fleet carriers. Such was the life of
a CVE pilot, less than glamorous when compared to their brothers on the large
fleet carriers.
The escort carriers present at Leyte Gulf were
headed by Rear Admiral Tommy Sprague, Commander Task Group 77.4. They consisted
of eighteen baby flattops, separated into three equal six-ship Task Units,
called "Taffies." At Leyte Gulf, the mission of the escort carriers
was to provide direct air support for the landings and to put up Combat Air
Patrols to protect the invasion fleet. The escort carriers at Leyte Gulf boasted
235 fighters and 143 torpedo planes. Each Taffy had a small screen of three
destroyers and four or five destroyer escorts. Most of the men who manned the
ships of Task Group 77.4 were reservists who had never seen any major action.
One drawback that would rear its ugly head at
Leyte was the lack of training received by the escort carrier pilots. Although
the CVEs carried some armor-piercing bombs and torpedoes, they were not
adequately stocked nor were their pilots adequately trained in warship-attack
tactics.
Although the CVEs were designated as
"aircraft carriers", the term is misleading. They were hardly a match
in comparison with the larger light and heavy carriers of the fleet. One-third
the size of the heavy carriers, they were cramped, unarmored, thin-hulled
vessels, unable to launch and recover aircraft with the ease of the larger
carriers. Despite their many restrictions, the escort carriers pulled a heavy
load at Leyte Gulf.
All three Taffies were stationed east of Leyte
Gulf, on a north-south axis. Rear Admiral Tommy Sprague himself commanded Task
Unit 77.4.1, known as Taffy I. His task unit operated ninety miles southeast of
Suluan Island, near Mindanao. One hundred miles to the north lay RADM Felix
Stump’s Task Unit 77.4.2, Taffy II. His group was parallel to the entrance of
Leyte Gulf. The northern most group of escort carriers, Task Unit 77.4.3, Taffy
III, belonged to RADM C.A.F. Sprague. Taffy III sailed thirty to sixty miles off
the shore of Samar, the large island northeast of Leyte. The escort carriers of
each Taffy were further organized into a two or four ship section, each
commanded by another Rear Admiral.
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ORGANIZATION OF U.S.
ESCORT CARRIERS AT LEYTE GULF
RADM Thomas L. Sprague,
USN, Commander Task Group 77.4
Task Unit 77.4.1 (Taffy I)
RADM Thomas L. Sprague
COMCARDIV 22 RADM Thomas L. Sprague
USS SANGAMON (CVE 26) (Flagship)
CAPT M.E. Browder
Air Group 37 LCDR S.E. Hindman
VF-37 16 F6F-3 & 5 F6F-5 LCDR S.E. Hindmman
VT-37 9 TBM-1C LCDR P.G. Farley
USS SUWANEE (CVE 27) CAPT
W.D. Johnson
Air Group 60 LCDR H.O. Feilbach
VF-60 22 F6F-3 LCDR H.O. Feilbach
VT-60 9 TBM-1C LCDR W.C. Vincent
USS CHENANGO (CVE 28) CAPT
G. van Deurs
Air Group 35 LCDR F.T. Moore
VF-35 22 F6F-3 LCDR F.T. Moore
VT-35 9 TBM-1C LCDR C.F. Morgan
USS SANTEE (CVE 29) CAPT
R.E. Blick
Air Group 26 LCDR H.N. Funk
VF-26 24 FM-2 LCDR H.N. Funk
VT-26 6 TBF-1C & 3 TBM-1C LCDR T.M. Bennett
COMCARDIV 28 RADM George R. Henderson
*USS SAGINAW BAY (CVE 82) (Flagship) CAPT
F.C. Sutton
VC-78 15 FM-2 & 12 TBM-1C LCDR J.L. Hyde Jr.
*USS PETROF BAY (CVE 80) CAPT
J.L. Kane
VC-76 16 FM-2 & 12 TBM-1C CDR J.W. McCauley
* = Detached
1645, 24 October 1944
Task Unit 77.4.2 (Taffy
II) RADM Felix B. Stump
COMCARDIV 24 RADM Felix B. Stump
USS NATOMA BAY (CVE 62) (Flagship) CAPT
A.K. Morehouse
VC-81 16 FM-2 & 12 TBM-1C LCDR R.C. Barnes
USS MANILA BAY (CVE 61) CAPT
Fitzhugh Lee
VC-80 16 FM-2 & 12 TBM-1C LCDR H.K. Stubbs
COMCARDIV 27 RADM William D. Sample
USS MARCUS ISLAND (CVE 77) (Flagship)
CAPT C.F. Greber
VC-21 17 FM-2 & 12 TBM-1C LCDR T.O. Murray
USS KADASHAN BAY (CVE 76) CAPT
R.N. Hunter
VC-20 15 FM-2 & 11 TBM-1C LCDR J.R. Dale
USS SAVO ISLAND (CVE 78) CAPT
C.E. Ekstrom
VC-27 17 FM-2 & 12 TBM-1C LCDR P.W. Jackson
USS OMMANEY BAY (CVE 79) CAPT
H.L. Young
VC-75 16 FM-2 & 11 TBM-1C LT A.W. Smith Jr.
Task Unit 77.4.3 (Taffy
III) RADM Clifton
A.F. Sprague
COMCARDIV 25 RADM Clifton A.F. Sprague
USS FANSHAW BAY (CVE 70) (Flagship) CAPT
D.P. Johnson
VC-68 16 FM-2 & 12 TBM-1C LCDR R.S. Rogers
USS ST LO (CVE 63) CAPT
F.J. McKenna
VC-65 17 FM-2 & 12 TBM-1C LCDR R.M. Jones
USS WHITE PLAINS (CVE 66)
CAPT D.J. Sullivan
VC-4 16 FM-2 & 12 TBM-1C LT E.R. Fickenscher
USS KALININ BAY (CVE 68)
CAPT T.B. Williamson
VC-3 14 F-2, 1 TBF-1C & 11 TBM-1C LCDR W.H. Keighley
COMCARDIV 26 RADM Ralph A. Ofstie
USS KITKUN BAY (CVE 71) (Flagship)
CAPT J.P. Whitney
VC-5 14 FM-2 & 12 TBM-1C CDR R.L. Fowler
USS GAMBIER BAY (CVE 73)
CAPT W.V.R. Vieweg
VC-10 18 FM-2 & 12 TBM-1C LCDR E.J. Huxtable
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From the beginning the escort carriers were
operating on three assumptions:
1) That any major enemy force approaching
from the north would be intercepted and attacked by the Third Fleet's big
carriers and fast battleships.
2) That enemy surface units might approach
the landing area from the Sulu Sea and Celebes straits, or through San
Bernardino Strait.
3) That it was most likely that the
Japanese would try the "Tokyo Express" runs to reinforce their
units in Leyte, or to harry the Americans.
The escort carriers arrived off Leyte Gulf on
October 17 and quickly were placed in a high operations tempo to support the
amphibious landings.
When the escort carriers arrived at Leyte they
were fully loaded with their proper aircraft armament mix of rockets, depth
charges, concussion bombs and the like. Each carrier also held about twelve
torpedoes and a small amount of semi-armor piercing bombs.
The officers and men who manned the ships in Task
Group 77.4 never imagined they would have to directly fight a major fleet
engagement on their own. They had become accustomed to their support role and
placed their trust in the large carriers and big guns of the U.S. Third Fleet.
Seventh Fleet’s reliance on the large fleet
carriers and fast battleships of Third Fleet was unmistakably sound. Guarding
VADM Kinkaid’s invasion fleet was ADM William F. Halsey's offensive Third
Fleet. He had under his direct command Task Force 38, consisting of four
powerful carrier task groups. This was the cream of the American fighting fleet
at Leyte Gulf, the armada that would destroy the Japanese fleet if the
opportunity presented itself.
Admiral Halsey, as Commander Third Fleet, flew
his flag in the new fast battleship NEW JERSEY. It was here he and his
staff made the decisions which would direct the course of the battle.
Admiral Halsey was given two objectives in the
Leyte battle plan. First, to:
"...cover and support forces of the
South-west Pacific Fleet (Seventh Fleet) in order to assist in the seizure
and occupation of objectives in the Central Philippines" and to
"destroy enemy naval and air forces in or threatening the Philippine
area....".
One final clause was added to the last objective,
giving Admiral Halsey a free hand in whatever he did:
"In case opportunity for destruction of
major portion of the enemy fleet is offered or can be created, such
destruction becomes the primary task."
Admiral Halsey believed this last clause was
added so he would not hesitate to attack the Japanese if the opportunity
offered. Admiral Spruance used extreme caution and failed to press his advantage
during the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944. Admiral Spruance was
privately criticized by Halsey for not aggressively attacking the Combined Fleet
when the opportunity arose. As history had shown, this was the primary
difference between the two admirals, each a direct opposite. Offense, not
defense, was to be Admiral Halsey's battle cry. The stage was now set for ADM
Halsey to use his vast Third Fleet assets.
Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher, Commander of Task
Force 38, was embarked in his flagship, the fleet carrier LEXINGTON. It
was his responsibility to issue orders to his four task group commanders.
However, during the course of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, he was often by-passed
by Halsey which led to serious consequences.
The strength of the task groups came from the
eight heavy and eight light carriers, which carried 1,178 aircraft. They were
supported by VADM Lee's six modern, 16-inch gun, fast battleships, IOWA, NEW
JERSEY, MASSACHUSETTS, SOUTH DAKOTA, WASHINGTON, and ALABAMA.
The fast battleships were divided into three groups, two each, assigned to Task
Groups 38.2, 38.3, and 38.4. All four task groups contained several cruisers and
many destroyers.
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ORGANIZATION OF U.S.
THIRD FLEET AT LEYTE GULF
ADM William F. Halsey, USN, Commander Third
Fleet in NEW JERSEY
VADM Marc Mitscher, USN, Commander Task Force 38
in LEXINGTON |
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Task Group 38.1
VADM John McCain |
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Task Group 38.2
RADM Gerald Bogan |
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Fleet carriers
Light carriers
Heavy cruisers
Light cruisers
Destroyers |
WASP
HORNET
HANCOCK
MONTEREY
COWPENS
CHESTER
PENSACOLA
SALT LAKE CITY
BOSTON
SAN DIEGO
OAKLAND
Fourteen ships |
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Fleet carriers
Light carriers
Battleships
Light cruisers
Destroyers |
ESSEX
LEXINGTON
PRINCETON
LANGLEY
MASSACHUSETTS
SOUTH DAKOTA
SANTA FE
BIRMINGHAM
MOBILE
RENO
Fifteen ships |
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Task Group 38.3
RADM Frederick Sherman |
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Task Group 38.4
RADM Ralph Davidson |
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Fleet carrier
Light carriers
Battleships
Light cruisers
Destroyers |
INTREPID
CABOT
INDEPENDENCE
IOWA
NEW JERSEY
BILOXI
VINCENNES
MIAMI
Sixteen ships |
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Fleet carriers
Light carriers
Battleships
Heavy cruisers
Destroyers |
FRANKLIN
ENTERPRISE
SAN JACINTO
BELLEAU WOOD
WASHINGTON
ALABAMA
WICHITA
NEW ORLEANS
Twelve ships |
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TG 38.1, commanded by VADM John McCain, was the
most powerful task group available, with three heavy and two light carriers. On
October 22, due to the non-stop operations conducted by Third Fleet, ADM Halsey
sent VADM McCain’s group back to Ulithi for much needed rest and provisions.
The decision to send the largest task group away from the Leyte operations area
would later prove to be a poor choice when the near-crisis events of the 25th of
October occurred.
With the departure of Task Group 38.1 the three
remaining task groups, TG 38.2, commanded by RADM Gerald Bogan; TG 38.3,
commanded by RADM Frederick Sherman; and TG 38.4, commanded by RADM Ralph
Davidson, roamed the waters of the Philippine Sea from the east coast of Luzon
to the southern tip of Samar.

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Robert Jon Cox webmaster@bosamar.com
last revised
July 12, 2008
Copyright Robert Jon Cox 1996-2008 all rights reserved
Void where prohibited.
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