|
This book has been edited to fit the internet.
The Battle Off Samar - Taffy III at
Leyte Gulf
SECOND EDITION
< Condensed Internet Version >
Copyright © 2001 Robert Jon Cox
All rights reserved
Ivy Alba Press, LLC
Time-Line, Events, & Comments
What makes this book unique is the use of a time-line for all events, all
listed in chronological, time-line order. The events in Chapters two through
nine are listed in the order in which the author believes they occurred.
Entries listed simply as "EVENT" are also placed in a chronological,
time-line order and are closely related in time to the last numbered
"time" event. Comments by the author associated with events are
often listed also. Entries are displayed as follows:
| 0708 |
A time-specific event, in the order in
which the author believes they actually occurred. |
| EVENT |
A specific event, closely related in time
to the last numbered "time" event. |
| A/C |
Author's Comment. A personal explanation
of events by the author. |
Chapter 5
0035 to 0630
SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT
Wednesday, October 25, 1944
0035 On October
25, 1944, the Imperial Japanese Navy Centre Force, in single column, exited the
restricted narrows of San Bernardino Strait unopposed and entered the Philippine
Sea. All hands were alert and at their battle stations expecting the telltale
flash of U.S. battleship guns.
| A/C
The navigation of San Bernardino Strait by a large number of warships
was said to be impossible by some, if not extremely hazardous. The
successful piloting of the strait can be attributed to the excellent
seamanship of the Japanese sailor.
A/C Since the
beginning of the war in the Philippines, the navigation lights marking
the strait had been darkened. On this evening however, a U.S.
reconnaissance aircraft reported the navigational lights had been relit.
This obviously only would have been done by the Japanese forces
stationed on Luzon and Samar. The U.S. fleets were under strict orders
not to enter the strait for fear of Japanese mines. In fact, all
internal waterways in the Philippines islands were suspected to be
heavily mined. |
VADM Matome Ugaki, IJN
Commander Battleship Division ONE
HIJMS YAMATO
"We safely navigated the San Bernardino Strait, taking advantage
of the light clouds which filmed the brightness of the moon (phase).
Turning east, we formed No. 19 Alert cruising disposition. At 0400 we
changed course to 150 and proceeded south ten miles off the coast of
Samar. We expected the penetration into Leyte Gulf at 1100, after first
rendezvousing with the Third Section (Southern Force) at 0900 at a point
10 miles east of Suluan Island." |
A/C Vice Admiral
Kurita rightfully thought he would have to fight is way out of San
Bernardino Strait. Fearing the Americans would "cross the ‘T’"
of his force as they transited the narrow strait, his ships may well have
fallen easy prey to the radar controlled 16-inch guns of Third Fleet’s
fast battleships. The Americans would clearly hold the advantage. If caught
in this predicament, he would be unable to maneuver in the restricted waters
of the strait and would have only the forward guns on his ships able to
respond. The American battleline, steaming in formation across the end of
the strait, would be in position to bear all their guns on the approaching
fleet as it exited the strait one-by-one. All the Japanese ships would be
subjected to concentrated fire as they approached the base of the American
"T."
A/C When it became
apparent that the American fast battleships were not there to meet him, the
next logical consideration under the circumstances was a submarine attack.
To the admiral’s relief, there were no torpedo wakes either. Shortly after
the last ship exited San Bernardino Strait, they prepared to form a standard
night-search disposition.
EVENT Upon exiting
the other side of San Bernardino Strait and entering the Philippine Sea,
Centre Force is ordered to head east for open ocean. They form four columns,
each five kilometers apart, on a broad 13 mile front, forming a standard
night-search disposition.
A/C Vice Admiral
Kurita still expected the Americans to resist their sortie at any moment. As
Centre Force sailed along cautiously, the admiral made plans for the morning
which he knew would once again bring out the American carrier borne air
strikes.
EVENT The Van and
Rear of the Japanese Southern Forces are contacted via ship-to-ship radio by
VADM Kurita and are ordered " . . . all forces will meet at 1000 off
the southern tip of Samar...."
A/C This comment
sounded quite casual considering what had happened to Centre Force the
previous day in the Sibuyan Sea. Third Fleet carriers would have his
force in range during their entire sortie; daylight air attacks were only a
matter of time. Vice
Admiral Kurita was set upon making the best of his current situation and he
planned accordingly.
A/C CVEs
were known throughout the fleet as Combustible, Vulnerable, and Expendable, or
"Kaiser coffins", named after their manufacturer, Henry J. Kaiser.
Taffy III's CVEs were CASABLANCA Class escort carriers; 512 feet long,
108 feet of beam, displacing 7,800 tons. Their armament consisted of a single
5-inch gun on their fantail, eight twin 40mm and twenty 20mm anti-aircraft guns.
Their biggest asset was their thirty aircraft. On average they carried 12
Grumman TBM Avenger torpedo bombers and 18 Grumman FM-2 Wildcat fighters.
A/C Taffy III had
three FLETCHER Class destroyers in its screen. Each destroyer had
five 5-inch radar controlled guns and two 5-mount torpedo tubes. The four
smaller destroyer escorts had two 5-inch guns apiece without radar control
and only three torpedo tubes. The destroyers were ten knots faster than the
destroyer escorts and they required 100 more men.
EVENT Inside the
Combat Information Center aboard Taffy III screening ship DE SAMUEL B.
ROBERTS all appears to be routine. Lieutenant Commander Robert W.
Copeland, her commanding officer, and LT Everett E. Roberts, Jr., her
executive officer, listen to the radio reports of the action in Surigao
Strait with great interest.
A/C Both
men had stayed up all night listening to the radio reports concerning the action
in Surigao Strait. They probably felt at this time that this was the closest
they would ever come in actual combat with an enemy surface fleet. ROBERTS
was one of the smallest ships of the fleet, outfitted primarily for
anti-submarine duty.
| A/C
The thirteen ships of Taffy III were currently in their night operating
area, further out to sea than during the day when they would be
conducting air operations.
0100 Nearing the
entrance to Surigao Strait, VADM Nishimura gives the order for his
Southern Force Van to assume its battle order for entering the strait.
Destroyer MICHISHIO leads, followed in a single line by DD ASAGUMO,
BB YAMASHIRO, and BB FUSO. The heavy cruiser MOGAMI
brings up the rear. Two destroyers patrol the port and starboard flanks,
DD SHIGURE and DD YAMAGUMO respectively. |
CTU
77.4.3/COMCARDIV 25 Action Report
RADM C.A.F. Sprague, USN
There was ample information of the mustering of the Jap naval forces
and their position, speed, and direction of movement to enable U.S.
commanders to estimate the situation with good accuracy... After the air
attack upon the northern group (centre force) of enemy ships by T.G.
38.3 on the afternoon of the 24th, it became quite clear that this group
might attempt to sortie through San Bernardino Straits. This possibility
was so apparent that there did not seem to be any reasonable doubt that
our own forces would fail to guard the eastern mouth of the Straits,
prevent the sortie of enemy units, and give timely notice of the enemy’s
attempt.
|
A/C After
being harassed continuously by torpedo boats, VADM Nishimura decided it was time
to form his ships into their battle order. This was the formation they would use
to enter Surigao Strait and battle their way into Leyte Gulf. He presently knew
nothing of the American force awaiting him at the north end of the strait, nor
was he coordinating his attack by waiting for VADM Shima’s Rear forces to
catch up with those of his own.
| A/C
One interesting fact is that while the Southern Force Van proceeded
toward Surigao Strait, encountering torpedo boats along the way, after
each encounter the Van would radio VADM Kurita and VADM Shima’s forces
stating, "...destroying enemy torpedo boats...." Vice Admiral
Nishimura communicated his actions to the Rear, yet he was unwilling, so
it seemed, to join forces with them. |
VADM Thomas Kinkaid,
USN
Commander Seventh Fleet
"The night before (24th) I had directed (RADM) Sprague to have
attack groups ready on deck (of the CVEs), looking forward to what might
be the morning situation. I'd directed him to send one attack group down
into Mindanao to get any stragglers or escapees from the night action
(Surigao Strait), which he did. I'd also directed him at daylight to
send a search to northward along the San Bernardino Strait. I did that
mostly out of curiosity to know what had gone on up there, because I
thought that (VADM) Lee was there with Task Force 34, and I didn't
expect to find anything that we had not planned. I was quite wrong in
that." |
0155 Vice
Admiral Kinkaid, Commander Seventh Fleet, orders RADM Thomas Sprague, Commander
Task Group 77.4 to direct his escort carrier commanders to fly three dawn
searches to cover San Bernardino Strait and its eastern and western approaches.
This is done mostly to satisfy VADM Kinkaid’s curiosity. He feels quite
comfortable knowing (self-convinced) VADM Lee's Task Force 34 fast battleships
are guarding San Bernardino Strait.
0208 Vice
Admiral Mitscher's Task Group 38 reconnaissance aircraft sight battleships ISE
and HYUGA, accompanied by four destroyers.
| 0230
Vice Admiral Kinkaid’s destroyer forces in Surigao Strait are deployed
and ready for action.
0230 Vice
Admiral Kurita receives another message from VADM Nishimura, stating
that his ships have entered Surigao Strait and have met only
light resistance from U.S. torpedo boats.
A/C His force
was in fact under attack from torpedo boats since just shortly before
midnight. Thirty-nine torpedo boats were split into thirteen 3-ship
groups. Their mission was to report Japanese ship movements, maintain
contact and, if possible, to attack.
A/C Well ahead
of schedule and at his present rate of advance, VADM Nishimura's
Southern Force Van would penetrate Surigao Strait and arrive in Leyte
Gulf about six hours ahead of Centre Force, upsetting the GHQ plan to
attack simultaneously.
A/C It should
have been very apparent to VADM Kurita that his two Southern Force
Commanders were not coordinating their attack. The Southern Force Rear
was currently about 40 miles behind the Van and was making no effort to
catch up. The two admirals were simply unwilling to coordinate their
forces to storm through Surigao Strait together. Unbelievably, no action
was taken by VADM Kurita, nor GHQ in Tokyo, to remedy this situation. 0238 Vice Admiral
Ozawa's carriers and escorts are sighted by Task Force 38 reconnaissance
aircraft. Believing they are within 90 miles of his Task Force, VADM
Mitscher recommends the formation of Task Force 34. Admiral Halsey approves
the recommendation to form Task Force 34. |
DESTROYER
FORCES in Surigao Strait
DESRON 54 CDR Coward
USS REMEY (DD 688)
USS McGOWAN (DD 678)
USS MELVIN (DD 680)
USS MERTZ (DD 691)
USS McDERMUT (DD 677)
USS MONSSEN (DD 798)
USS McNAIR (DD 679)
DESRON "X" CDR Hubbard
USS CLAXTON (DD 571)
USS CONY (DD 508)
USS THORN (DD 505)
USS AULICK (DD 569)
USS SIGOURNEY (DD 643)
USS WELLES (DD 628)
DESRON 56 CDR Smooth
USS NEWCOMB (DD 586)
USS RICHARD P. LEARY (DD 664)
USS ALBERT W. GRANT (DD 649)
USS ROBINSON (DD 562)
USS HALFORD (DD 480)
USS BRYANT (DD 665)
USS HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS (DD 663)
USS BENNION (DD 662)
USS LEUTZE (DD 481)
DESRON 24 CAPT McManes
USS HUTCHINS (DD 476)
USS DALY (DD 519)
USS BACHE (DD 470)
USS KILLEN (DD 593)
USS BEALE (DD 471)
HMAS ARUNTA (DD) (RAN) |
A/C The Japanese
carriers were actually 210 miles from the Americans. Task Force 34 was then
formed and consisted of battleships WASHINGTON (flagship of VADM
Lee), ALABAMA, IOWA, NEW JERSEY (flagship of ADM
Halsey), MASSACHUSETTS, and SOUTH DAKOTA, heavy cruisers WICHITA
and NEW ORLEANS, light cruisers VINCENNES, MIAMI, BILOXI,
SANTA FE, and MOBILE, and eighteen destroyers.
0300 Well into open
ocean, Centre Force now turns southeast, steaming at 20 knots off the east
coast of Samar.
0309 Approaching
Surigao Strait in battle order, BB FUSO comes under attack by
American destroyers and is hit by at least one torpedo. Numerous fires erupt
and her engine room is severely damaged. The fires spread to her magazines
and a tremendous explosion blows the ship into two pieces.
0320 Light cruiser ABUKUMA
of the Southern Force Rear is struck by a torpedo from PT 137,
killing 30 men. Unable to continue north, she is detached from the Rear by
VADM Shima and is sent westward to retire at 9 knots.
0320 Destroyer MONSSEN
hits BB YAMASHIRO with one torpedo. Badly damaged, two magazines are
immediately flooded to avoid a possible catastrophic explosion.
0320 In what is
considered the most successful American destroyer torpedo attack of the
entire war, the destroyer McDERMUT cripples the Van’s destroyers MICHISHIO
and ASAGUMO, and sinks DD YAMAGUMO outright, which explodes so
violently it is seen 20 miles away by RADM Oldendorf in CA LOUISVILLE.
A/C This was the
beginning of the highly effective American destroyer attacks in Surigao
Strait. The American destroyers approached in groups of three, launched
their torpedoes, and retired at high speed back up the strait. At this time
several destroyers came under intense fire but none were hit. During this
phase of the battle, several Japanese ships were crippled or sunk.
Battleships YAMASHIRO and FUSO are both seriously damaged by
the attacks.
0330 Rear Admiral
Thomas Sprague, Commander Task Group 77.4, orders Taffy II to provide
aircraft for dawn searches over the approaches to San Bernardino Strait. The
message is received an hour late by RADM Stump on CVE KADASHAN BAY
and he later tasks CVE OMMANEY BAY with the mission. Ten Avengers are
prepared for this mission on a rain-soaked deck but the planes are not ready
to fly until almost 0700.
A/C The Philippine
tropical weather, notably the rainy season, was taking its toll on air
operations.
A/C In addition to
their reconnaissance duties, the escort carriers were also notified to
standby to attack the Japanese stragglers from the Battle of Surigao Strait.
Because of this order, many of the CVEs were prepared to launch aircraft
with torpedoes and semi-armor piercing bombs to deal with the stragglers of
the Battle of Surigao Strait. Unknown by the CVE commanders, this planning
would pay off ten-fold later in the morning during the Battle Off Samar.
0335 Vice Admiral
Kurita receives another message from VADM Nishimura’s Van stating his
force has sighted three enemy ships.
A/C The worst was
yet to come for the Van. Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf had assembled a large
reception for the Japanese forces approaching Leyte Gulf from the south. On
station northwest of Hibuson island at the northern entrance to Surigao
Strait were all six old battleships, four heavy cruisers, and four light
cruisers.
0351 The right and
left flank cruisers open fire with their main batteries on the approaching
Van.
A/C Battleship YAMASHIRO
was about eleven and one-half miles from the Seventh Fleet battleline when
the order to open fire was given. The heavy cruisers were stationed about
three and one-half miles south of the battleships, closer to the approaching
Japanese. Vice Admiral Nishimura’s remaining forces were met with a
torrential downfall of 16, 14, 8, and 6-inch shells.
0353 Battleship WEST
VIRGINIA opens fire with her 16-inch main batteries on the Van.
| 0355
Battleships CALIFORNIA and TENNESSEE open fire with their
14-inch main batteries on the Van.
0358 Destroyer MICHISHIO
is hit by several torpedoes from destroyer HUTCHINS and sinks
almost instantly.
0359 Battleship MARYLAND
opens fire with her 16-inch main batteries on the Van.
A/C Only DD SHIGURE
survived the onslaught of RADM Oldendorf’s battleline. They defended
the strait brilliantly by crossing the enemy's "T", a tactic
which had become the envy of battleline commanders since the day of the
Japanese-Russo one-sided duel in Tsushima Strait in May 1905. Oldendorf’s
battleline was deployed across the northern end of Surigao Straight with
all guns bearing southward on the approaching Japanese warships. When
the Van initially approached, torpedo boats first attacked, followed by
the destroyers. Rear Admiral Oldendorf's six old battleships, cruisers,
and assorted vessels made quick work of the Southern Force Van.
Battleships YAMASHIRO and FUSO were sunk outright, as were
most of the other unfortunate ships. 0400 Centre Force
changes course to 150° and steams nearly southward, 10 miles off Samar. |
SEVENTH
FLEET BATTLELINE DURING THE BATTLE OF SURIGAO STRAIT
Commander Bombardment and
Support Group RADM Oldendorf
Battle Line RADM Weyler
USS MISSISSIPPI (BB 41)
USS MARYLAND (BB 46)
USS WEST VIRGINIA (BB 48)
USS PENNSYLVANIA (BB 38)
USS CALIFORNIA (BB 44)
USS TENNESSEE (BB 43)
Right Flank Cruisers RADM Berkey
HMAS SHROPSHIRE (CA) (RAN)
USS BOISE (CL 47)
USS PHOENIX (CL 46)
Left Flank Cruisers RADM Oldendorf
USS LOUISVILLE (CA 28)
USS PORTLAND (CA 33)
USS MINNEAPOLIS (CA 36)
USS DENVER (CL 58)
USS COLUMBIA (CL 56) |
| RADM
Oldendorf’s battleline crosses the "T" and destroys the
Southern Force Van |
EVENT Vice Admiral
Shima’s Southern Force Rear warships proceed northward up the approach to
Surigao Strait at 28 knots. His four destroyers lead, followed by heavy
cruisers NACHI and ASHIGARA.
EVENT Vice Admiral
Shima shortly thereafter sights what appears to be two burning ships in the
water ahead. He immediately concludes they are the Van’s two battleships FUSO
and YAMASHIRO. Next he sights the Van's retreating destroyer SHIGURE,
which is having rudder difficulties. Heavy cruiser NACHI and DD SHIGURE
exchange recognition communications and SHIGURE continues southward.
A/C The two
burning ships VADM Shima sighted were in fact the two separate halves of BB FUSO.
After DD SHIGURE encountered VADM Shima’s Rear, the retreating
destroyer proceeded southward without giving any information to the advancing
Rear about the demise of the Van. This was another clear indication of the lack
of coordination and communications which plagued the entire southern pincher
operation.
| EVENT
The Van’s CA MOGAMI is sighted "dead in the water" by
the advancing Rear forces. Although she has been hard hit, MOGAMI is
still making way, unknown by VADM Shima's advancing Rear forces.
0409 Last of the
battleships to do so, MISSISSIPPI opens fire with her 14-inch
main batteries on the Southern Force Van just after the word to
cease-fire is given by RADM Oldendorf.
A/C Battleship MISSISSIPPI
had great difficulty locating a target for her guns; she finally ranged
off of the other ship's shell fall. |
CDR
Kokichi Mori, IJN
Staff Officer
HIJMS NACHI - Southern Force Rear
"We sighted a large fire and a burning fireball a considerable
distance ahead and as we approached we saw two large ships afire. We
concluded that they must be the two battleships of Battleship Division
Two (YAMASHIRO and FUSO) which were completely afire and
burning furiously, silhouetting their hulls. Also at this time, sighted
ahead near the limit of visibility flashes . . . from friendly and enemy
gunfire and were able to conclude that MOGAMI and the destroyers
of the Third Section (Van) had penetrated and were now engaged in
furious combat." |
A/C The
order to cease fire was given by RADM Oldendorf because the American destroyer ALBERT
W. GRANT of CDR Smoot’s DESRON 56 was repeatedly hit by friendly shell
fire from 0407 onward. This was to be the only significant damage suffered by
the Americans during the Battle of Surigao Strait, except for a few unlucky PT
boats which received only minor damage.
| A/C
Although the amount of ordnance placed on the Southern Force Van was
great, of the six old battleships present, only four fired more than one
salvo. Battleship WEST VIRGINIA led with 93 rounds of 16-inch
armor-piercing shells. TENNESSEE came in second with 69
14-inch shells, and CALIFORNIA managed 63. MARYLAND's
16-inch guns fired 48. Due to their antiquated fire-control radar, MISSISSIPPI
fired only one salvo and PENNSYLVANIA none at all. Because of
their lack of armor-piercing ammunition, the battle plan required the
battleships to withhold their fire until the Japanese had approached to
within 20,000 yards. A/C The cruisers on
the other hand, fired their main batteries in rapid fire mode. Rear Admiral
Oldendorf’s left flank cruiser COLUMBIA fired 1,000 rounds alone.
This number is astounding when you consider the total number of shells fired
by the cruisers was 3,100. Two ships of this group, PHOENIX and BOISE,
fire their main batteries in continuous rapid fire and later slowed to
conserve ammunition. |
BATTLE LINE gun size
and shell expenditures
in Surigao Strait action |
| Battleship |
Guns |
Shells
Expended |
| WEST
VIRGINIA |
16-inch |
93 |
| TENNESSEE |
14-inch |
69 |
| CALIFORNIA |
14-inch |
63 |
| MARYLAND |
16-inch |
48 |
| MISSISSIPPI |
14-inch |
9 |
| PENNSYLVANIA |
14-inch |
0 |
| 0412
Vice Admiral Kinkaid and his staff meet during the Battle of Surigao
Strait and review Seventh Fleet tasking for the day’s upcoming events.
The battle in Surigao Strait is coming off like clock- work. Vice
Admiral Kinkaid and his staff are extremely pleased with RADM
Oldendorf's success.
EVENT At the
recommendation of an aide VADM Kinkaid is urged to contact Third Fleet
to confirm the status of Task Force 34's location in San Bernardino
Strait.
|
VADM
Thomas Kinkaid, USN
Commander Seventh Fleet
"Had (VADM) Lee been in the straits with Task
Force 34, he would, if he had made any contacts, have reported them
immediately to everyone. The mere fact that in the morning there was no
report from him seemed to indicate that everything was all right.
In the middle of the night or early morning of the 25th I called a
meeting in my cabin of the staff and everyone connected with operations
to see if there was anything they had forgotten to do, or anything doing
that was wrong, to see if anything needed change or to be added to. All
went over the situation." |
EVENT Seventh Fleet
sends ADM Halsey the following message inquiry:
"...QUESTION. IS TF 34 GUARDING SAN
BERNARDINO STRAIT?"
It wasn't.
Subsequently, the message is not received by Admiral Halsey until 0648.
0415 Aboard escort
carrier GAMBIER BAY Flight Quarter Stations are manned.
0419 Vice Admiral
Nishimura’s flagship BB YAMASHIRO, severely damaged by the
battleline, is hit on her port side by two torpedoes from the DD NEWCOMB.
Unable to sustain further damage, she finally sinks, taking with her VADM
Nishimura.
0420 Southern Force
Rear heavy cruisers NACHI and ASHIGARA prepare to launch a
torpedo attack against two targets gained on their surface radar.
EVENT Shortly
thereafter, VADM Shima’s heavy cruisers launch eight torpedoes apiece by
radar. Heavy cruiser NACHI then literally runs into trouble. Unaware
that the Van’s CA MOGAMI is making way, CA NACHI is struck
on her port side by the Van's damaged heavy cruiser, causing serious damage
to both ships. As a result, CA NACHI is forced to retire to assess
her damage.
A/C The Southern
Force Van’s piecemeal destruction was closely followed by the Rear’s
retreat. Vice Admiral Shima, upon seeing the fate of VADM Nishimura's force,
knew he was out-gunned and quickly chose not to go any further. This was the
American high-water mark of the Battle of Leyte Gulf followed shortly
thereafter by, farther to the north, the Battle Off Samar.
EVENT Aboard Taffy
III's DE ROBERTS in her Combat Information Center, word is heard over
the radio that the Japanese fleet has been routed in Surigao Strait. As a
result, her Commanding Officer, LCDR Copeland, is lulled into a false sense
of security.
| 0430
All ships in Taffy III go to General Quarters for morning air
operations. Planes assigned to Combat Air Patrol, anti-submarine patrol,
and reconnaissance duties are readied and launched before sunrise.
0431 Destroyer
Escort DENNIS assumes cruising formation within the task unit.
A/C DENNIS
was the senior destroyer escort within Taffy III, as determined by the
seniority of her Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander Hansen.
0457 Escort
carrier GAMBIER BAY commences launching 8 FM-2 Wildcat fighters. |
CTU
77.4.3/COMCARDIV 25 Action Report
RADM C.A.F. Sprague, USN
When the enemy attack by the southern force through
Surigao Straits developed, the question of the whereabouts of the enemy
northern component (Centre Force) became even larger and more
formidable. This unit had never been assigned any responsibility for
covering the exit of San Bernardino Straits, either by reconnaissance or
by force, and in the absence of any information that this exit was no
longer blocked, it was logical to assume that our northern flank could
not be exposed without ample warning.
Had this T.U. had any reason to suspect that an enemy sortie could be
made through San Bernardino Straits undetected by other U.S. forces, a
search to the northwest would have been launched from a more easterly
position, and it is possible that a direct surface action could have
been avoided. |
0500 The first
scheduled flights for Task Unit 77.4.3 are launched.
0505 The last FM-2
Wildcat fighter from CVE GAMBIER BAY’s morning Combat Air Patrol is
launched.
0522 The crew of DE DENNIS
man their battlestations for dawn alert. Condition Easy is set.
0530 Escort Carrier ST
LO launches a Target Anti Submarine Patrol of two Avenger Torpedo
Bombers and four Wildcat FM-2 fighters for the Leyte Gulf area.
A/C Taffy III
completed the launching of a Target Combat Air Patrol consisting of 12
fighters to protect the shipping in Leyte Gulf.
EVENT As daylight
proper soon approaches, Centre Force is directed to form a defensive
circular formation to maximize their anti-aircraft protection from the air
attacks, expected to arrive shortly.
A/C This circular
formation was their best proven defense from air attack. An air attack by
Third Fleet aircraft was expected shortly after first light. As before in
the Sibuyan Sea, the battleships and heavy cruisers would group in the
center with the destroyers on the outside perimeter.
0532 Admiral Kurita
receives a message from RADM Shima, Southern Force Rear Commander, stating
that VADM Nishimura’s Southern Force Van "has been destroyed."
0545 Rear Admiral
Thomas Sprague's Task Unit 77.4.1 (Taffy I) launches aircraft to pursue the
fleeing remnant of the Japanese Southern Forces in Surigao Strait.
0545 Air operations
complete, DE DENNIS changes course to 350° T, speed 15 knots, and
assumes cruising disposition 5-R within the task unit.
0551 Ensign Hans L.
Jensen is launched from Taffy II's CVE KADASHAN BAY in his TBM-1C for
an anti-submarine patrol mission in the waters off Samar.
0600 Escort carrier GAMBIER
BAY and the other ships of Taffy III steam northward off the coast of
Samar in their assigned operations area, unaware of the impending danger
from the Japanese Centre Force.
0600 Destroyer
Escort DENNIS commences zig-zagging according to plan #25 of USF 10A.
0607 A Support Group
of four torpedo bombers is launched from the escort carriers of Taffy III.
Shortly thereafter, two more are launched as Target Anti-Submarine Patrol
sweep in the same area. Aircraft to safeguard Taffy III are also launched.
0614 Sunrise.
A/C The new day's
sun rose slowly with partly overcast skies and occasional rain squalls,
typical for this time of year.
| 0620
Escort Carrier ST LO secures from General Quarters. The weather
is spotty, with scattered, fairly extensive, rain squalls and
considerable haziness.
0623 U.S.
aircraft are detected by radar from BB YAMATO.
0630 Aboard
Taffy III flagship CVE FANSHAW BAY, RADM Clifton Sprague sends a
signal by TBS directing all ships of Taffy III to "...secure from
General Quarters. Set Condition 3," normal underway watches. |
CAPT W.V.R. Vieweg,
USN
Commanding Officer
USS GAMBIER BAY (CVE 73)
"At about 0620, as I recall it, the sun came up. It gives you an
idea of how dark it was when our planes were launched. At 0630 we had
been at general quarters, of course, since about 0430 at the time we
started the warming up of planes for the 0500 launch. At about 0630 the
officer in tactical command, Rear Admiral C.A.F. Sprague sent a signal
by TBS to the effect that commanding officers might secure from general
quarters at discretion. I secured from general quarters and went to
condition 3 but remained on the bridge as did the navigator who was
working up his morning position." |
A/C The men
of Taffy III considered the "busy work" for the morning over. The
first aircraft of the new day were launched without incident. The men of Task
Unit 77.4.3 would now enjoy breakfast, relax a while, and prepare for another
busy day of providing air support for the invasion troops landed on Leyte.

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last revised
July 12, 2008
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