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This book has been edited to fit the internet.
The Battle Off Samar - Taffy III at
Leyte Gulf
SECOND EDITION
< Condensed Internet Version >
Copyright © 2001 Robert Jon Cox
All rights reserved
Ivy Alba Press, LLC
Time-Line, Events, & Comments
What makes this book unique is the use of a time-line for all events, all
listed in chronological, time-line order. The events in Chapters two through
nine are listed in the order in which the author believes they occurred.
Entries listed simply as "EVENT" are also placed in a chronological,
time-line order and are closely related in time to the last numbered
"time" event. Comments by the author associated with events are
often listed also. Entries are displayed as follows:
| 0708 |
A time-specific event, in the order in
which the author believes they actually occurred. |
| EVENT |
A specific event, closely related in time
to the last numbered "time" event. |
| A/C |
Author's Comment. A personal explanation
of events by the author. |
Chapter 6
0630 to 0706
"GENERAL ATTACK"
Wednesday, October 25, 1944
| 0630
Rear Admiral Ziggy Sprague’s Task Unit 77.4.3, Taffy III, steams
northward off the coast of Samar, course 355° T. The individual
warships of Taffy III issue the order for their crews to secure from
General Quarters. All hands now stand down from morning air operations
and settling into their morning routine.
0630 TBS - Mercury
3 v Taffy 3, "SIGNAL EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT CHARLIE
FORMATION FIVE ROGER. GEORGIA AND FIGLEAF ACKNOWLEDGE" .... v
GEORGIA, FIGLEAF, "WILCO OUT."
A/C This was
Taffy III’s eighth day of duty at Leyte Gulf. The six small CVEs were
taxed to their fullest, each day more difficult than the one before.
EVENT Aloft on
ASP, ENS Jensen's radioscope operator sights numerous blips to the
northwest of Taffy III’s current position. Although it is out of his
area of responsibility, he closes to investigate. 0637 The combat
information center on CVE FANSHAW BAY receives Japanese voice
transmissions on the inter-fighter direction network. The voices heard are
definitely Japanese, and they sound very excited. |
TALK BETWEEN SHIP (TBS)
Radio Call Signs of
TASK UNIT 77.4.3 (TAFFY III) |
Unit
CTU 77.4.3 (RADM Sprague)
Task Unit 77.4.3 (all 13 ships)
Screen Cdr (CAPT Thomas)
Screening Ships (3 DD, 4 DE)
The six Escort Carriers
Screening Ships (all 7 ships) |
Call-sign
Taffy 3
Taffy 33
Mercury 3
Mercury 33
Great Danes
Small Boys |
Escort
Carriers
FANSHAW BAY
ST LO
KALININ BAY
WHITE PLAINS
KITKUN BAY
GAMBIER BAY |
Call-sign
BENDIX
DERBY
GEORGIA
FIDO
DEXTER
CATNIP |
Destroyers
HOEL
HEERMANN
JOHNSTON |
Call-sign
NEBRASKA
DREADNAUGHT
BRASSLOCK |
Destroyer
Escorts
J.C. BUTLER
RAYMOND
DENNIS
S.B. ROBERTS |
Call-sign
OVERTURE
FIGLEAF
MONGREL
JUGGERNAUGHT |
A/C This was thought
to be an attempt by the Japanese to jam the inter-fighter direction network.
By this point Centre Force may have been reacting to the approaching
American reconnaissance aircraft or they may have already sighted some of
the warships of Taffy III, hull-down.
0637 TBS - Taffy
3 v NEBRASKA, "INTERROGATORY CONDITION ONE." .... v Taffy
3, "ROGER OUT."
0640 Centre Force
changes course to nearly due south.
| EVENT
Ensign Jensen's TBM from CVE KADASHAN BAY of Taffy II visually
sights the warships of Centre Force and closes further to investigate.
EVENT Ensign
William C. Brooks of CVE ST LO's Composite Squadron VC-65 is also
nearby on ASP for Taffy III. He sights the warships of Centre Force
almost simultaneously with ENS Jensen's ASP and he also closes to
investigate.
EVENT Ensign
Jensen's TBM from CVE KADASHAN BAY comes within range of the
anti-aircraft guns of the Japanese warships. Flak is put up in an
attempt to down the shadowing U.S. aircraft. |
USS KALININ BAY (CVE
68)
Action Report
A plane on anti-submarine patrol from USS KADASHAN BAY reported to the
OTC (Officer in Tactical Command) a task force composed of 4 enemy
battleships, 6 cruisers, and numerous destroyers bearing 270° T distance
20 miles from this formation at 0654. The pilot of the plane definitely
identified the task force as enemy. This information was conveyed to this
ship over the Inter-fighter Director Net (37.6 mcs). Immediately after
this report, excited Japanese voices were heard over the IFD net. A
frequency test was made and it was found that the Japanese were directly
on 37.6 mcs. On orders from the OTC General Quarters was sounded at 0658
and speed increased to flank... |
A/C Now that VADM
Kurita knew Centre Force had been sighted, he expected another air attack
from Third Fleet in very short order.
0643 Escort Carrier KADASHAN
BAY's anti-submarine patrol aircraft closes the range further and
identifies the warship types of Centre Force. Ensign Jensen reports its
location to Taffy II's flagship CVE NATOMA BAY. Rear Admiral Sprague
on Taffy III's flagship CVE FANSHAW BAY only receives a garbled
transmission of ENS Jensen's report.
A/C Except for the
garbled Japanese voice transmissions heard on the inter-fighter direction
network, this was RADM Sprague's first true indication that something was
awry.
| EVENT
Moments later, ENS Brooks of CVE ST LO sends an urgent voice
report to Taffy III's flagship CVE FANSHAW BAY. "ENEMY
SURFACE FORCE OF 4 BATTLESHIPS, 7 CRUISERS, AND 11 DESTROYERS SIGHTED 20
MILES NORTHWEST OF YOUR TASK GROUP AND CLOSING IN ON YOU AT 30
KNOTS."
A/C ST LO’s
Action Reported stated "An LASP plane from the ST LO piloted
by Ensign Brooks of VC-65 reported contact with a Japanese
Surface Force bearing 330° T twenty to thirty miles from Task Unit
77.4.3. This report was made to Commander Task Unit 77.4.3. The Japanese
Force was estimated by Ensign Brooks as consisting of four BB, four CA,
two CL and ten to twelve DD." This voice report was extremely
accurate in Japanese force number and composition. |
RADM
C.A.F. Sprague, USN
Commander TASK UNIT 77.4.3 (Taffy III)
"My first thoughts were they'll steam on down
close to the Leyte coast, meanwhile sending out a few cruisers to polish
us off. That will be about a fifteen minute job....if we can get this
task force to attack us, we can delay its descent on Leyte until help
comes, though obviously the end will come sooner for us.
While the ack-ack was still chasing Brooks, we made visual contact
with the Japs. Out of the fog loomed his big battlewagons...pagoda masts
and all...and opened with their 14- and 16-inch (and 18.1-inch) guns at
25,000 yards. He had committed his whole task force to an attack on
us." |
EVENT Rear Admiral
Sprague hears the voice report from ENS Brooks. Annoyed by the transmission,
he immediately orders, "...AIR PLOT, TELL HIM TO CHECK HIS
IDENTIFICATION...."
A/C Rear Admiral
Sprague believed ENS Brooks had spotted U.S. Third Fleet warships (Halsey).
He theorized, as did all Seventh Fleet, Task Force 34 was guarding San
Bernardino Strait and he therefore had no worries concerning his northern
sectors. Thus, he had no knowledge that the entire Third Fleet was presently
on its way north to engage VADM Ozawa’s decoy Northern Force. In addition,
he believed Centre Force was presently on it's way back to Borneo after the
severe pounding it received from Third Fleet's carrier aircraft the previous
afternoon in the Sibuyan Sea. He had no reason to believe otherwise, until
now....
| 0644
Centre Force visually sights the masts of four ships from Taffy III. The
Japanese believe they have sighted destroyers. Next, three carriers,
three "cruisers," and two more "destroyers" are also
sighted.
A/C The Japanese
were not familiar with U.S. warship type recognition and most certainly
they were not familiar with the recognition characteristics of the CASABLANCA
Class escort carriers. The Pacific war was one of long-range carrier
action. It was very seldom sailors aboard ships from either side got a
good look at their enemies’ ships. The Japanese misidentification of
the American warships would play an important part in their logic and
tactics throughout the battle. |
VADM Matome Ugaki, IJN
Commander Battleship Division ONE
HIJMS YAMATO
"At 0644, just before the order to form circular
formation was issued, four masts, apparently destroyers, were suddenly
spotted bearing 060° to port, 37 kilometers from YAMATO...This
was followed by the sighting of three carriers, three cruisers, and two
destroyers.
It was a surprise encounter since no situation reports had been
received since the previous night, and although we had long considered
various measures for such an event, the ships, I thought, were extremely
slow in reacting because of their lack of enemy information. Measures
taken by the fleet headquarters, too, occasionally seemed lacking in
promptness. At any rate at 0658 Battleship Division 1 opened fire with
its forward guns at a range of 31 kilometers..." |
EVENT After
receiving flak from the Japanese BB HARUNA, ENS Jensen attacks the
nearest ship and drops two depth charges, the only weapons at his disposal,
on a heavy cruiser. Ensign Brooks follows suit in his TBM.
0645 Flak is sighted
on the northwestern horizon by the lookouts of Taffy III. Alerted by the
lookout reports, the radar operator on CVE FANSHAW BAY turns his
radar set toward the reported flak and immediately afterwards, radar contact
is made with the approaching ships of Centre Force. The Japanese fleet bears
330° T.
| 0645
A large unidentified surface force indication appears on SG radar
bearing 300° T distance 23½ miles aboard CVE GAMBIER BAY.
EVENT Soon
thereafter, the towering pagoda masts of the large Japanese warships are
sighted bearing on the horizon. Both fleets are now in visual contact
with each other.
EVENT Battleship
YAMATO opens fire on the lurking U.S. aircraft.
A/C Visual and
radar contact with Centre Force was surprisingly made almost
simultaneously by Taffy III from the signal and open bridges. Although
visibility was very poor, the pagoda-like masts of the Japanese
battleships could be seen astern. Taffy III was steering course 090° T.
Shortly after the first contact report, the CIC aboard CVE ST LO
gave the enemy forces range as "30,000 (yards) Closing." |
CAPT
W. V. R. Vieweg, USN
Commanding Officer
USS GAMBIER BAY (CVE 73)
"At about 0645 things commenced to happen. We
intercepted a rather frantic voice transmission from a plane we believed
was in an adjacent task unit, Task Unit 77.4.2. The gist of the message
was that the Jap fleet was there somewhere about 40 miles from his home
station.
We didn't have to wait long to get additional information. One of our
own task unit's anti_submarine patrol planes reported the presence to
the northwestward, distance about 25 miles, of a Japanese fleet
consisting of four battleships, eight cruisers and 13 destroyers. Almost
simultaneously there reached me on the bridge a report from the radar
room, and there was visible in the PPI on the bridge a force which could
be nothing but enemy since we knew of no one that should be in a
position 25 miles to the northwest of us. The radar plot confirmed the
report from our anti_submarine patrol." |
A/C Upon sighting
each other, confusion reigned high on both sides from the very beginning.
The Japanese had no knowledge of U.S. escort carriers and they believed they
were up against a much larger unit such as a task group. Taffy III was
mistaken for one of Third Fleet's heavy fleet carrier task groups with an
ample cruiser and destroyer screen. The Japanese over-estimation of the
American opposition caused VADM Kurita to proceed cautiously.
0648 Sobering
confirmation is received aboard flagship CVE FANSHAW BAY. Ensign
Brooks reports, "...THE SHIPS HAVE PAGODA MASTS...." the trademark
tiered-towering masts of Japanese warships.
0648 Far to the
north of the present unfolding and chaotic situation off Samar, VADM
Kinkaid's message inquiry concerning the safeguard of San Bernardino Strait
is received by ADM Halsey aboard BB NEW JERSEY.
A/C This message was
Seventh Fleet's inquiry sent earlier in the morning at 0412. Admiral
Halsey's shocking reply is not received by Seventh Fleet until 0703.
0648 Battleship KONGO,
very aggressively commanded throughout the entire engagement, independently
turns eastward to pursue the American warships on course 080° T. The
remaining warships of Centre Force continue on a southeasterly heading.
0650 Gun fire is
observed in the distance off the port quarter of DE DENNIS. It is
determined to be anti-aircraft fire of unknown origin.
0650 TBS - Taffy
3 v OVERTURE, "ANTIAIRCRAFT BURSTS BEARING 300, OVER."
.... v Taffy 3, "ROGER OUT."
A/C Rear Admiral
Sprague later stated in his Action Report:
"As it was, the only warning came from
an Anti_Sub_Patrol TBM who reported being fired upon by a large group of
enemy ships to the northward. This warning came when the enemy main body
was only about 17 miles away, closing very rapidly on a nearly opposite
course, and only shortly before major caliber shells began to fall in our
midst. From this point on, it was a question of extracting the 6 CVE's, 3
DD's, and 4 DE's from a situation fraught with disaster."
A/C Although the
Americans held the technological advantage of radar and improved sensors,
the impossible had happened....they were surprised and brought into gun
range by a vastly superior enemy force of front-line capital warships.
EVENT Rear Admiral
Sprague sends an immediate dispatch to all ships of Taffy III over TBS,
"JAP FLEET SIGHTED." He orders the task unit to course 180° T,
then 090° T. Flank speed is ordered and all ships of the task unit quickly
comply.
A/C Centre Force was
approaching from bearing 330° T. The final course taken by Taffy III would
enable the carriers to launch aircraft and at the same time, draw away from
the bearing on the Japanese fleet. The wind, needed to launch the aircraft,
was coming from 075° T to 080° T.
| 0650
Upon sighting the advancing Japanese armada, Destroyer JOHNSTON, one
of three destroyers in Taffy III’s screen, passes word throughout the
ship, "...WE ARE BEING PURSUED BY A LARGE PORTION OF THE JAP
FLEET...." General Quarters is immediately sounded and all hands
rush to man their battle stations.
A/C Destroyer JOHNSTON
had gone to General Quarters so many times during her brief life that
her crew had resorted to calling her "GQ Johnny." |
CDR
Ernest E. Evans, USN
Commanding Officer
USS JOHNSTON (DD 557)
On October 27, 1943, at JOHNSTON's
commissioning ceremony at the Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Company, CDR
Evans gave her crew fair warning about the type of ship he would be
running.
"...This is going to be a fighting ship. I intend to go in
harm's way, and anyone who doesn't want to go along had better get off
right now. Now that I have command of a fighting ship, I will never
retreat from an enemy force...." |
A/C JOHNSTON
is commanded by hard-charging CDR Ernest Evans, a man with a vigorous
fighting instinct, known to be part Cherokee Indian. By no coincidence, he
was nicknamed "Chief" at the Naval Academy, a term that caused
some confusion within the Navy, as it is also the term used to address Chief
Petty Officers, the U.S. Navy’s senior enlisted men.
0650 TBS - Mercury
3 v Taffy 3, "SIGNAL EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT SHACKLE BAKER
UNCLE EASY UNSHACKLE TURN. FIDO AND NEBRASKA ACKNOWLEDGE." .... v FIDO,
NEBRASKA, "WILCO OUT."
A/C The task unit
changes course to 090° T, due east.
EVENT As the ships
of Centre Force bear down over the horizon, their masts and superstructures
begin to come into view. As the remaining ships of Taffy III become aware of
the situation, General Quarters is sounded and the men of the task unit man
their battle stations.
A/C At this point,
the view from both sides must have been alarming. The thirteen ships of
Taffy III, with the six escort carriers grouped in the middle, must have
appeared as a formidable fleet to the Japanese. Believing six large carriers
lay before them, they rationalized there must be a sizeable screening force
too, including several cruisers. Likewise, the sight of the twenty-three
warships of Centre Force by Taffy III must have seemed like the end of the
world. For 898 of it’s men, it would be.
EVENT Destroyer JOHNSTON's
captain, CDR Evans, orders his engine room to commence making funnel smoke.
Shortly thereafter, thick-black smoke pours from JOHNSTON’s stack
and begins to trail aft of the ship. Due to the tropical humidity, the smoke
lays low on the water, an ideal condition for the defending ships of Taffy
III.
A/C JOHNSTON
was credited as the first ship of Taffy III to make funnel smoke....before
all others. Commander Evans was credited with much that day. His ability to
foresee unfolding events and commandeer each situation without prompting is
clear indication of his professionalism, war fighting expertise, and is also
evidence of his superb fighting character.
0652 From aboard BB YAMATO,
Vice Admiral Kurita and his staff busily assess the threat which lays ahead.
He orders the ships of Centre Force to advance at 24 knots to close the
range on the American carriers. All ships reply and increase their speed
accordingly.
A/C The top speed of
the slowest battleship, NAGATO, was just over 24 knots tops. This
limited the pace of the other battleships, if they were to stay together and
fight as an organized unit. This organization would be thrown out the window
unintentionally shortly thereafter by another order issued by VADM Kurita at
0703.
0653 All warships of
Centre Force are now ordered east to strike at the head units of Taffy III.
0653 Radio
transmissions in Japanese are received aboard CVE ST LO on SCR 808.
Anti-aircraft fire from the Japanese warships is seen.
0655 TBS - Mercury
3 v Taffy 3, "STANDBY TO LAUNCH ALL PLANES FOR ATTACK ON
ENEMY FLEET 15 MILES ASTERN."
A/C Rear Admiral
Ziggy Sprague reacts calmly, displaying the true professionalism which came
with his years of combat-tested and command experience. All available
aircraft are hurriedly readied to be launched from the decks of all six
escort carriers.
| 0655
Aboard CVE GAMBIER BAY aircraft of Composite Squadron VC-10
spotted on the flight deck are prepared for immediate action, their
engines running in preparation for launch.
0655 Lieutenant
Commander Hansen of DE DENNIS orders the crew to general
quarters. More anti-aircraft fire is observed on the horizon, forward on
the port beam.
A/C There were
no blimps on DENNIS’ radar screen of the approached Japanese
warships. The weather at this time was very squally which limited
visibility.
0656 TBS - Mercury
3 v Taffy 3, "LAUNCH ALL PLANES AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE."
|
CAPT
W. V. R. Vieweg, USN
Commanding Officer
USS GAMBIER BAY (CVE 73)
"Without waiting for instructions I commenced
launching all planes on deck since I was under immediate threat of
losing everything due to a shell hit on deck and setting the planes on
fire. I managed to launch all ten remaining fighters on deck and in
addition, the seven torpedo planes that were on deck. Unfortunately the
torpedo planes were not fully loaded with bombs or torpedoes due to the
situation.
You see we had our planes loaded for missions involving direct
support of shore troops and the loading for that was a combination of
some planes with 100 pound bombs and others with 500 pound general
purpose bombs. Our next scheduled flight, scheduled for 1000, was an
anti_submarine patrol and we were caught in the process of shifting
bombs and hence some of our planes had the depth bombs in them that they
would be used at 10 o'clock, some of them had nothing in them and others
still had the general purpose bombs in them." |
0657 TBS - Mercury
3 v Taffy 3, "CAUTION ALL PILOTS TO IDENTIFY ALL SHIPS
BEFORE ATTACKING. DEXTER ACKNOWLEDGE." .... v DEXTER, "WILCO
OUT."
A/C Rear Admiral
Sprague believed yet that the enemy warships sighted on the horizon may be
American.
0657 Escort carrier GAMBIER
BAY commences launching all aircraft.
| 0658
The order is given by the BB YAMATO to open fire with her front
turrets. Battleship YAMATO opens the engagement with bellows from
her massive 18.1-inch guns. The other Japanese warships open fire with
their large caliber guns at 35,000 yards, approximately eighteen miles.
A/C This was the
first time YAMATO's main battery had been fired at American
warships. With the largest active naval guns in World War II, the
Japanese had high expectation as to what she could do with them.
0658 TBS - Taffy
3 v JUGGERNAUGHT, "WE HAVE SPLASHES FALLING ASTERN OF
US. WE ARE UNDER FIRE BY ENEMY FLEET. FULL SPEED AHEAD."
A/C The
destroyer escort SAMUEL B. ROBERTS, aka "JUGGERNAUGHT"
was caught in the thick it as she steamed in the rear area of the task
unit.
0658 From the
escort carrier ST LO, splashes from the first enemy salvoes are
observed. The CVE WHITE PLAINS appears to be under fire. At least
three salvoes are observed. Two straddle CVE WHITE PLAINS and one
is short. At least three more salvoes are observed short of flagship FANSHAW
BAY.
0658 Unaware of
Taffy III's predicament and as earlier directed, CVE OMMANEY BAY of
Taffy II launches a search plane to cover the approaches to San Bernardino
Strait.
A/C This was the
reconnaissance patrol ordered by RADM Thomas Sprague, Commander Task Group
77.4, earlier that morning at 0330. Local rain squalls off Samar had
significantly slowed the launch.
|
COMPOSITION
OF CENTRE FORCE
AT TIME OF ATTACK
Battleship Division ONE
BB YAMATO
BB NAGATO
Battleship Division THREE
BB KONGO
BB HARUNA
Cruiser Division FIVE
CA HAGURO
CA CHOKAI
Cruiser Division SEVEN
CA KUMANO
CA SUZUYA
CA TONE
CA CHIKUMA
Destroyer Squadron TWO
CL NOSHIRO
DD FUJINAMI
DD KISHINAMI
DD OKINAMI
DD HAMANAMI
DD HAYASHIMO
DD AKISHIMO
DD SHIMAKAZE
Destroyer Squadron TEN
CL YAHAGI
DD URAKAZE
DD ISOKAZE
DD YUKIKAZE
DD NOWAKI |
EVENT Within
seconds, an avalanche of various colored water plumes rise high in the
morning air near the astonished ships of Taffy III. The seriousness of their
dilemma now sets in.
A/C The first shells
that rained down upon Taffy III landed between DD JOHNSTON, DE ROBERTS,
and flagship CVE FANSHAW BAY, approximately 2,000 yards from the
center of the task unit.
A/C Each Japanese
ship fired shells which were marked with a different color dye that
distinguished it’s salvos from the others. Battleship YAMATO’s
shells were colored pink, BB KONGO’s were yellow. The other ships
salvos were marked in red, blue, green, purple, and one ship had no color at
all.
A/C Japanese
fire control at this stage of the war was far behind that of the U.S. Navy.
Because their fire control radar was unreliable, they devised a system of
placing colored dye in their shells to mark the fall of each shot and to
help distinguish each ships salvos. Once the shells exploded, spot checkers
would distinguish their ship’s shell fall, note the range, and relay any
range, bearing, and deflection corrections to their fire control personnel.
0659 TBS - All
carriers, "MAKE FULL SPEED AHEAD ZIG ZAG 15 DEGREES EITHER
SIDE."
| 0700
TBS - Taffy 33 v Taffy 3, "MAKE SMOKE ASTERN OF
US."
A/C The
admiral's initial orders were carried out as numerous colorful shell
splashes pepper the water between the ship’s of his bewildered task
unit.
0700 Japanese
Battleship Division One, YAMATO and NAGATO, pursue the
American task unit on a southeasterly course with the warships of
Destroyer Squadron TEN further ahead.
0701 TBS - Taffy
2 v Taffy 3,"COME IN PLEASE" . . . . "COME IN
PLEASE". |
USS
KALININ BAY (CVE 68) Deck Log
0400-0800, 25 October 1944
LCDR B. STALNAKER, USNR
0654 Friendly aircraft reported an enemy task force of 4 battleships,
6 cruisers and numerous destroyers bearing 270 <
(T), 20 miles. All engines ahead at flank speed. General Quarters. c/c
to 090<
(T), 087<
pac. All prisoners released from brig. Made smoke from stacks. Position
at 0700. 11<
44' N . 126<
31' E. 0705 Sighted at 34,500 yds. a Japanese task force of 2
battleships, 3 cruisers, heavy, 8 destroyers. Enemy began shelling.
Salvos hitting in water close by in all directions. 0706 Commenced
launching and catapulting. 0725 Finished launching and catapulting. |
A/C Under fire,
Taffy III now attempted to contact its sister task unit to the south for
assistance. A sense of urgency can readily be seen in this radio
transmission.
0701 TBS - Taffy 33
v Taffy 3 "LAY SMOKE SCREEN ASTERN OF US." .... v Taffy
33, "WILCO OUT."
EVENT As shells fall
around the ships of Taffy III, RADM Sprague sends an uncoded distress call
to the other Taffies reporting his situation including a request for
immediate assistance.
0702 Black funnel
smoke begins to pour from the stacks of the escort carriers, destroyers, and
destroyer escorts of Taffy III. In addition, the destroyers and destroyer
escorts make white chemical FS (phosphorized sulfur) smoke on their fantails
to add to the increasingly dense cover of smoke.
|
0703 After cautious
evaluation of the tactical situation by he and his staff, VADM Kurita issues
the order "GENERAL ATTACK" to all warships of Centre Force. EVENT As a
result of his battle order, VADM Kurita consciously decides that the two
destroyer squadrons will bring up the rear in a supporting action. The four
battleships and six heavy cruisers of Centre Force are signaled to form
pursuit disposition.
|
Admiral Kurita's
decision for "general attack" was based upon the following
logic:
1. The enemy was encountered at a time when neither
he nor we expected it.
2. Employing every trick to him, the enemy would try
to put distance between himself and us (if possible maneuver himself to
the windward of us) so that he could carry out a one-sided air action
against us.
3. So that we could take advantage of this heaven-sent opportunity we
should take after the enemy in present formation and at top speed. |
A/C After several
setbacks, VADM Kurita now believed things were going his way. He envisioned
that an entire American carrier task group laid before him. He considered
the sighted warships as a very befitting target for his warships.
0703
Admiral Halsey replies to VADM Kinkaid's early morning inquiry (0412)
received at 0648, concerning the location of Task Force 34 and the
safeguard of San Bernardino Strait. To VADM Kinkaid’s disbelief VADM
Lee’s Task Force 34 was not guarding San Bernardino Strait.
Admiral Halsey’s reply read, "NEGATIVE. TASK FORCE 34 IS WITH
CARRIER GROUPS NOW ENGAGING ENEMY CARRIER FORCE."
A/C The American
fast battleships of Third Fleet were currently on their way north with
the Third Fleet carriers preparing to engage VADM Ozawa’s decoy
Northern Force.
A/C The misconstrued
communications between Seventh and Third Fleets were the gravest American
error committed during the entire Battle of Leyte Gulf.
0703 Escort Carrier KITKUN
BAY completes the launching of eight FM-2 Wildcat Fighters from
Composite Squadron VC-5.
A/C Fortunately,
these planes had been warming up prior to the enemy being sighted. The first
Grumman FM-2 fighter was launched shortly after 0656.
0703 TBS - Taffy
33 v JUGGERNAUGHT, "DO YOU WANT US TO COME BACK AND HELP YOU
ON SMOKE SCREEN." .... v Taffy 3, "AFFIRMATIVE"
0703 The destroyers
and destroyer escorts of Task Unit 77.4.3 start laying a smoke screen.
EVENT Battleship YAMATO
continues to leash out at the fleeing escort carriers of Taffy III with her
massive 18.1-inch guns.
EVENT Aboard BB YAMATO,
Vice Admiral Kurita optimistically sends the following message to ADM Toyoda
and his staff at GHQ in Tokyo:
"BY HEAVEN-SENT OPPORTUNITY WE ARE
DASHING TO ATTACK THE ENEMY CARRIERS."
A/C Vice Admiral
Kurita was under pressure to react quickly. At the time, he did not know the
exact composition of Taffy III, believing he was up against Third Fleets
heavy ESSEX Class fleet carriers with BALTIMORE Class cruiser
and destroyer escorts. Believing the first air attacks against his ships
would come from this force, his plan was to destroy the carrier flight decks
first, before their air power could be brought to bear upon his fleet.
EVENT The heavy
ships of Centre Force’s battleship and cruiser divisions, previously
maneuvering to form an anti-aircraft defensive circular formation, now rush
forward to attack Taffy III independently of each division and without
coordination.
A/C If it was
Third Fleet’s heavy carriers they had sighted, their logic was they had to
destroy the flight decks immediately, before their aircraft could be
launched to strike against them.
A/C When the word
"general attack" was received, some of the warships of Centre
Force charged forward as divisional units; others, BB KONGO
specifically, acted independently. Hindsight tells us that VADM Kurita
should have formed battle line to deal with the slow moving escort carriers.
EVENT The four IJN
heavy cruisers of Cruiser Division Seven, KUMANO, SUZUYA, TONE,
and CHIKUMA, form up and begin their pursuit of the Americans in
earnest. Their course takes them almost due east, to the north side of the
fleeing American warships. The remaining Japanese heavy cruisers, HAGURO
and CHOKAI of Cruiser Division Five, follow CRUDIV 7.
EVENT Vice Admiral
Kinkaid, Commander Seventh Fleet, receives an uncoded distress call from
RADM Sprague stating Task Unit 77.4.3 is under attack by heavy warships of
the Japanese fleet.
EVENT Rear Admiral
Felix Stump, Commander Task Unit 77.4.2 (Taffy II), hears RADM Sprague’s
uncoded distress call on board his flagship CVE NATOMA BAY. He
replies to RADM Sprague with a shrill in his voice, "DON’T BE ALARMED
ZIGGY, REMEMBER WE’RE BACK OF YOU, DON’T GET EXCITED, DON’T DO
ANYTHING RASH!"
A/C Rear Admiral
Stump’s Taffy II was currently steaming about 20-25 miles southeast of
RADM Sprague’s task unit. The thought of his fellow Taffy's predicament
had shaken him. His task unit would have the luxury of staying on the edge
of the battle between Centre Force and Taffy III for the duration of the
battle. As such, he was able to respond with a controlled urgency and send
off balanced air attacks, unlike his cornered counterpart to the north.
| 0704
Escort Carriers WHITE PLAINS and flagship CVE FANSHAW BAY,
nearest to the Japanese, are both straddled by kaleidoscopic 14-inch
salvos from battleships HARUNA or KONGO. These near-misses
explode so violently CVE WHITE PLAINS is rocked mercilessly,
causing her steering and electrical power to temporarily fail. With a
loss of electrical power, her steering is disabled and she looses
steerage way.
EVENT Four more
heavy shells land close aboard CVE WHITE PLAINS, exploding with
great turbulence and hurling several men off their feet. From the
distance, to the Japanese ships, she appears to be burning furiously and
out of control, definitely hard hit by their heavy shells. |
VADM Matome Ugaki, IJN
Commander Battleship Division ONE
HIJMS YAMATO
"At about 0700 it was said that there were six carriers. From
0706 we advanced generally on an easterly course and employed our
secondary guns at the enemy who appeared from behind the smoke. It was
generally about this time that one carrier (WHITE PLAINS) was
sunk, one carrier (ST LO) was heavily damaged, one cruiser (HOEL)
was sunk, etc. We were now rapidly approaching the enemy - the range by
radar was 2200 meters and visibility was gradually improving from the
east. We hoped to destroy the enemy at one blow if he came out from
behind the smoke. In the meantime we were attacked by enemy aircraft.
Several salvos from medium caliber enemy guns fell near YAMATO,
and two shells hit the starboard after gallery and outer boat
shed..." |
EVENT Thick black
funnel smoke from CVE WHITE PLAINS misleads the Japanese gunners who
believe she is now on fire and disabled. They change targets and their heavy
salvos are now diverted to the neighboring escort carrier ST LO.
EVENT Escort Carrier
ST LO and the remaining CVEs come under increasingly heavy caliber
fire from the battleships and heavy cruisers of Centre Force. As 18.1, 14,
and 8-inch shells rain down on the ships, the number of multi-colored shell
splashes reaches their pinnacle.
A/C Rear Admiral
Sprague, "in the ultimate of desperate circumstances" later
remarked:
"...the enemy was closing with
disconcerting rapidity and the volume and accuracy of fire was increasing.
At this point it did not appear that any of our ships could survive
another five minutes of the heavy-caliber fire being received...."
The warships of Taffy III were truly in a
tight predicament.
EVENT Destroyer JOHNSTON,
the closest DD to the Japanese, travels in the rear of Taffy III laying
thick-black smoke as she goes. The flash of the guns from the Japanese ships
coming over the horizon can clearly be seen by the naked eye. To the relief
of many of her crew members, JOHNSTON is heading away from the
Japanese fleet as it appears to rapidly gain on the slower ships of Taffy
III.
EVENT Commander
Evans, Destroyer JOHNSTON's commanding officer, passes word to his
crew, "...PREPARE TO ENGAGE MAJOR PORTION OF JAPANESE FLEET...."
Destroyer JOHNSTON is immediately turned towards the nearest column
of Japanese warships, Cruiser Division Seven. She proceeds on an intercept
course to engage heavy cruisers KUMANO, SUZUYA, TONE
and CHIKUMA, without orders to do so.
A/C The closing
speed between JOHNSTON and the enemy cruiser division was estimated
to be greater than 60 knots.
EVENT Far to the
north of the present action between Centre Force and Taffy III, shortly
after 0700, VADM Mitscher orders VADM Lee to form battle line, Task Force
34. Battleships WASHINGTON, ALABAMA, IOWA, NEW
JERSEY (Halsey’s flagship), MASSACHUSETTS, and SOUTH DAKOTA,
heavy cruisers WICHITA and NEW ORLEANS, light cruisers VINCENNES,
MIAMI, BILOXI, SANTA FE, and MOBILE, and
eighteen destroyers drawn from all three task groups.
EVENT Task Force 34
is now assembled to engage the Japanese Northern Force in a surface action.
Admiral Halsey, unaware of Taffy III’s current predicament, is focused on
his upcoming engagement with VADM Ozawa’s decoy force.
A/C The
consistency of Task Force 34 had now changed from the original battle plan
message Admiral Halsey had sent the evening of 24 October. Now, all six fast
battleships would be formed as the core of VADM Lee’s battle line.
| 0705
Escort carrier GAMBIER BAY completes the launching of all
Composite Squadron VC-10 aircraft spotted on her flight deck.
Four more aircraft, TBM-1C Avenger Torpedo-bombers, remain below on the
hangar deck. Of these aircraft, two are launched with torpedoes, three
with bombs, two with depth-charges, and two with no weapons at all.
A/C Although GAMBIER
BAY managed to send up many aircraft, nearly her entire aircraft
complement, only the two armed with torpedoes were a real threat to
Centre Force. The remaining aircraft, impotent as they were,
concentrated on harassing the Japanese fleet and slowed their advance. |
USS WHITE PLAINS (CVE
66)
Action Report
The results may indicate that the Jap surface gunnery is not very
good as all 13 of our ships involved should have been sunk by the number
of projectiles thrown at them. This ship was not hit but it received so
many straddles that by the laws of chance it should have been hit
several times. One...salvo...14-inch...was almost the gunners’ delight
with four close overs and two close shorts...the laws of probability and
chance were not operating in favor of the Japs that day. The shooting
was good but the percentage of hits was very low, at least on this ship.
No accurate estimate of total number of rounds fired can be given but
photographs taken from this ship show about 180 splashes. |
0706 Japanese
Battleship Division One, YAMATO and NAGATO, change course to
070° T.
0706 Still under
increasingly heavy fire from Centre Force, the van of Taffy III ducks into a
heavy rain squall which immediately reduces visibility to less than half a
mile....

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last revised
July 12, 2008
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