|
This book has been edited to fit the internet.
The Battle Off Samar - Taffy III at
Leyte Gulf
SECOND EDITION
< Condensed Internet Version >
Copyright © 2001 Robert Jon Cox
All rights reserved
Ivy Alba Press, LLC
Time-Line, Events, & Comments
What makes this book unique is the use of a time-line for all events, all
listed in chronological, time-line order. The events in Chapters two through
nine are listed in the order in which the author believes they occurred.
Entries listed simply as "EVENT" are also placed in a chronological,
time-line order and are closely related in time to the last numbered
"time" event. Comments by the author associated with events are
often listed also. Entries are displayed as follows:
| 0708 |
A time-specific event, in the order in
which the author believes they actually occurred. |
| EVENT |
A specific event, closely related in time
to the last numbered "time" event. |
| A/C |
Author's Comment. A personal explanation
of events by the author. |
Chapter 8
0730 to 0800
SMALL BOYS SCREENING ACTION
Wednesday, October 25, 1944
| 0730
The escort carriers of Taffy III exit the squall in a circular formation
with ST LO the furthest north, closest to the Japanese, base
course 190° T. Ahead and to her port quarter are KALININ BAY and
GAMBIER BAY. Furthest to the south is KITKUN BAY. Ahead
and on ST LO's starboard quarter bow are flagship FANSHAW BAY
and WHITE PLAINS.
A/C As the enemy
had continued to close and to come up on the northward side, the Task
Unit Commander changed course to the right, in two or more increments,
to 180° T at about 0730 and a little later to 240° T, to avoid
remaining for long periods on a steady course.
|
VADM
Thomas Kinkaid, USN
Commander Seventh Fleet
"The CVEs were being driven south by the
Japanese cruisers. I had a dispatch from (RADM) Sprague asking for
permission to enter Leyte Gulf. I sent back a negative reply. To enter
Leyte Gulf meant that they would be in confined waters. They'd be easy
marks for Jap air, and if they got as far as the entrance of Leyte Gulf,
he would be joined by my surface ships for cover. The message I sent to
(RADM) Oldendorf, as soon as I had the report of our CVEs under fire,
was to assemble all of his ships at the northern part of the entrance to
Leyte Gulf, get them all there as quickly as possible.
That was followed a little bit later by an order to divide his ships
into two groups, and to send one group outside to buoy...a marker buoy
to our entrance to Leyte Gulf. I didn’t want to send those ships
outside of Leyte Gulf, although at the time the CVEs were in dire
need...but I couldn’t let them be hammered to pieces without doing
anything, so I gave these preliminary orders." |
0730 Upon
exiting the rain squall, RADM Sprague radios an urgent message to VADM
Kinkaid, Commander Seventh Fleet, requesting permission to move his fleeing
escort carrier force toward the safety of Seventh Fleet's battleships and
cruisers near the Leyte Gulf invasion beach. Vice Admiral Kinkaid’s answer
is "NO."
A/C By saying
no, VADM Kinkaid let RADM Sprague know he considered Taffy III expendable.
It had been said that Seventh Fleet's old battleship and cruiser forces near
the southern approaches to Leyte Gulf were now low on ammunition after
having just defeated the Japanese Southern Force in the Battle of Surigao
Strait earlier that morning. It is arguable just how low in ammunition they
were.... Vice Admiral Kinkaid, a resolute commander who was always in
control, would choose where and when his fleet would fight.
A/C Seventh
Fleet was in poor position to support Taffy III at this time; the reasons
being many. Although their performance against the Japanese Southern Force
was an unqualified success, they were hardly a match for a fleet the size
and strength of Centre Force. Vice Admiral Kinkaid knew the possibility now
existed that Centre Force may make it all the way to Leyte Gulf intact. What
was worse, coming to grips with the realization that Third Fleet had
abandoned him, he now had to prepare for the unplanned contingency of fighting
a force he never should have fought!?
A/C The only Seventh
Fleet unit currently in a position to help RADM Sprague was Taffy II, and
they themselves were dangerously close to Centre Force.
| A/C
This placed VADM Kinkaid in a dilemma. Totally misled by ADM Halsey’s
earlier battle plan communication, Commander Seventh Fleet had to plan
for the worst.
A/C During the
Battle of Surigao Strait, RADM Oldendorf’s battleships and cruisers
had expended most of their armor piercing-ammunition. If Centre Force’s
"heavily" armored ships proceeded to Leyte Gulf in their
present formation of four battleships, six to eight cruisers, and their
destroyers, Seventh Fleet would require a significant amount of
armor-piercing ammunition in order to stop them. Adding to this crisis
was the fact that the slow battleships were not fully loaded with
armor-piercing ammunition from the start of the Leyte operation, since
their main objective was to provide shore bombardment. |
LTJG
Joseph A. Mamica, USNR
Damage Control Officer
USS JOHN C. BUTLER (DE 339)
"I was the Officer of the Deck on the 0400
watch.... ...It was already getting light when I heard over the radio
that ‘enemy ships are closing in on Taffy 3 about 20 miles away.’ I
immediately called our skipper, LCDR John E. Pace, and reported what I
had heard. In a moment he was on the bridge and ordered General
Quarters. I went to my station below deck as Damage Control Officer.
Not long after that I heard the bombardment of the guns, shouting of
orders, and felt the erratic movement of the ship as the Captain took
evasive maneuvers to avoid the bombs. Near misses grazed the BUTLER
on the sides. I felt the concussion on my body. Admiral Sprague gave
orders for ‘torpedo strikes.’ Our sister ships, RAYMOND and DENNIS,
made the torpedo attacks. We were the next to go, but at the last moment
Admiral Sprague changed the order, ‘to make smoke’ and hide the
ships that were damaged." |
A/C When RADM
Oldendorf’s old battleships arrived at Leyte Gulf, only one-fifth of their
ammunition on board was armor-piercing. Previously at Yap, they had been
loaded with high-capacity shells to support their scheduled shore
bombardment duties. Earlier during the Leyte operation, they had expended
over one-half of their high-capacity shells fulfilling these duties,
including some of their armor-piercing shells on some of the harder targets
found ashore.
A/C The American
heavy cruisers at Surigao Strait loaded two-thirds of their ammunition in
high-capacity shells, the remaining third was armor-piercing. During their
engagement with VADM Nishimura’s Southern Force Van, they had almost
wastefully used about eighty percent of their load. At the end of the
fighting the light cruisers did however, still carry about 50-80
armor-piercing shells apiece.
A/C The destroyers
of Seventh Fleet were in a much more desperate state of affairs. During the
Battle of Surigao Strait they had expended all, if not most of their
torpedoes. As with the armor-piercing shells, no torpedo replacements were
readily available. If matters were not grave enough, at this point, all of
the ships were low in fuel. October 25 was their scheduled replenishment
day.
0730 After careful
evaluation of the tactical situation, VADM Kurita orders the fast heavy
cruisers of Centre Force to pursue the Americans at top speed on course
110° T.
A/C Vice Admiral
Kurita feared the American carriers were getting away and would soon be out
of reach. The rain squall and highly effective smoke screen was hindering
the Japanese effort.
0730 From the port
quarter, the escort carriers are sighted once again as they exit the rain
squall. They immediately come under heavy concentrated fire from heavy
cruisers TONE, CHIKUMA, HAGURO, and CHOKAI who
attempt to outflank the escort carriers to port. Multi-colored shells once
again fall among the ships of Taffy III.
A/C With KUMANO
and SUZUYA of Cruiser Division Seven out of action, the two
remaining heavy cruisers, TONE and CHIKUMA, were joined by
Cruiser Division Five’s two ships, HAGURO and CHOKAI. The
threat to Taffy III is now greater than ever as the two heavy cruiser
divisions coordinate their attack and rapidly close the escort carriers from
their port quarter.
| EVENT
Escort carrier GAMBIER BAY, on the rear-port quarter, comes under
intense shell fire from the approaching heavy cruisers.
A/C The picture
at this point in the battle looked bleak for the Americans. The four
heavy cruisers were quickly approaching the escort carriers from their
port quarter. They were now closing to within optimum range for their
8-inch guns. On the starboard quarter, Destroyer Squadron Two, led by
the light cruiser NOSHIRO was in position to limit Taffy III’s
maneuvering space to a southern direction only. Finally, from the rear,
the four battleships came down the middle adding their heavy guns to the
free-for-all. Rear Admiral Sprague’s options were very limited. He had
to sacrifice his screening ships to save the escort carriers. |
CAPT
W. V. R. Vieweg, USN
Commanding Officer
USS GAMBIER BAY (CVE 73)
"I maneuvered the ship alternately from one side
of the base course to another as I saw that a salvo was about due to
hit. One could observe that the salvos would hit some distance away and
gradually creep up closer and from the spacing on the water could tell
that the next one would be on if we did nothing. We would invariably
turn into the direction from which the salvos were creeping and sure
enough the next salvo would land right in the water where we would have
been, if we hadn't turned. The next few salvos would creep across to the
other side and gradually creep back and would repeat the operation. This
process lasted for, believe it or not, a half hour during which the
enemy was closing constantly." |
EVENT Under
increasingly heavy near-misses, CVE GAMBIER BAY resorts to chasing
salvos to avoid being hit.
A/C "Chasing
salvos" consisted of turning the ship toward the last shell splash, in
hope that Japanese fire control would try to correct their aim and shoot in
a different direction to correct their aim. This technique kept GAMBIER
BAY from under the heavy guns for over half an hour.
EVENT Japanese
Destroyer Squadron Two, led by the CL NOSHIRO approaches the escort
carriers from their starboard quarter in an attempt to block their escape
toward Leyte Gulf.
A/C Nearly
forty-five minutes have passed since the Japanese first charged the escort
carriers. Rear Admiral Sprague's constant course changes and dense smoke
screen were buying time and aided in keeping the distance between his
fleeing carriers and the pursuing warships.
A/C In addition to
RADM Sprague's grace-saving efforts, the Japanese helped by not cutting
corners on their approach. Instead, they concentrated on cutting off the
task unit’s escape to open ocean by boxing it in on three sides. However,
this is not to say the Japanese were not closing the escort carriers; they
were!
EVENT The two
Japanese destroyer squadrons, originally ordered to bring up the rear, are
now utilized to work the starboard flank of the escort carriers in an
attempting to box them in and drive them back towards the battleships’ big
guns.
0732 The escort
carriers are ordered to course 170° T to help keep their distance from the
heavy cruisers approaching on their port quarter. Rear Admiral Sprague
orders all airborne aircraft to concentrate on the heavy cruiser column.
Heavy cruisers CHIKUMA, TONE, HAGURO, and CHOKAI
press on in an attempt to cut off the escort carriers’ retreat.
0732 TBS - Taffy
2 v GALLEY, "I HAVE FOUR FISH LOADED WITH TORPEDOES AND FOUR
FIGHTERS READY TO GO WHEN READY." .... v Taffy 2, "ROGER
OUT."
A/C An escort
carrier of Task Unit 77.4.2 (Taffy II) reports is has four TBM torpedo
bombers and four FM-2 fighters ready for launch.
0733 TBS - Taffy
3 v CATNIP, "WILL LAUNCH ONE FISH WITH A FISH IN IT IN ABOUT
ONE MINUTE."
A/C "FISH"
was the radio codename for an Avenger torpedo bomber....the second
"FISH" refers to a torpedo.
0733 From the escort
carrier ST LO, the Japanese force bears 275° T, 19,500 yards, and
closing.
0733 Crossing astern
of BB NAGATO, IJN BB HARUNA fires on a "cruiser" as
it reveals itself from behind the smoke.
0734 TBS - Taffy
3 v BRASSLOCK, "HAS CONTACT REPORT BEEN MADE, OVER."
A/C Inquiry from JOHNSTON.
0735 TBS - v Taffy
3, "OPEN UP WITH PEASHOOTER ON STERN."
A/C When the nearest
Japanese warship had closed to 23,000 yards, an order to open up with the
5"/38 GP guns on the stern of the escort carriers was given, "when
within range."
0735 TBS - Taffy
33 v Taffy 3, "DELIVER FISH ATTACK, OVER." .... v Taffy
33, "WILCO OUT."
0735 Maneuvering at
full speed, about 22 knots, DENNIS is positioned at 270° T on the
task unit formation, between the CVEs and the advancing enemy warships.
0736 TBS - Mercury
3 v Taffy 3, "ALL GREAT DANES STANDBY TO OPEN UP WITH YOUR
GUNS WHEN RANGE IS CLEAR."
A/C At this point
the nearest Japanese warships were closing on the escort carriers (Great
Danes), but were still out of range of the CVEs single 5-inch guns. The gun
crews were ordered to prepare or "STANDBY" to open fire when the
enemy warships were with in the effective range ("WHEN RANGE IS
CLEAR") of their 5-inch guns.
0736 TBS - OVERTURE
v Taffy 3, "ARE YOUR TORPEDOES READY, OVER?"
0736 TBS - MONGREL
v Taffy 3, "ARE YOUR TORPEDOES READY, OVER?" .... v MONGREL,
"AFFIRMATIVE."
| 0736
TBS - Taffy 33 v JUGGERNAUGHT, "DO YOU WANT LITTLE
FELLOWS TO GO IN WITH BIG, OVER."
0737 TBS - JUGGERNAUGHT
v Taffy 3, "NO."
0737 TBS - Mercury
33 c Taffy 33, "BIG FELLOWS MAKE FIRST RUN, FORM ON ME
IN ORDER, DREADNAUGHT, NEBRASKA, BRASSLOCK. LITTLE FELLOWS FORM UP FOR
SECOND RUN. BRASSLOCK, JUGGERNAUGHT, WILCO OUT."
A/C The closest
Japanese warships were now bearing 302° T, 14,000 yards. Many salvo
splashes were noted throughout the formation. All ships were making
maximum smoke and all the CVEs were firing their single 5-inch guns. The
ST LO singled out a heavy cruiser at 14,000 yards astern,
closing, apparently not under fire from any other CVE. |
LCDR
Robert W. Copeland, USN
Commanding Officer
USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS (DE 413)
"As I waited (for the torpedo attack) I thought,
"My God, how are we going to work this?" The destroyers were
on their way making a torpedo run. I knew that the skipper of the DENNIS
was the senior DE skipper....since nobody designated exactly how the DEs
would make their torpedo attack nothing happened.
My Executive Officer was down in CIC and I just took a look at the
general situation and where the cruiser column was and estimated the
course to put me sixty degrees on the bow of the cruiser column....by
seaman's eye I estimated my course change to the left to bring me to
what I estimated the course would be and at the same time I reached over
and grabbed the handle on the squawk box....I said "Well, Sis on
you, pister. Let's go!" and added, "...give me a course to put
me sixty degrees on the bow of the leading ship in that cruiser
column...." In less than thirty seconds I was given a course that
was bout six degrees to the left of the one I had picked....I came to it
and we were on our way and committed to go in on a torpedo
attack...." |
Three
hits were claimed, one forward of the forward turret starting a fire, and
two between the bridge and the first stack. Escort Carrier ST LO’s
Action Report stated, "...a CA (heavy cruiser) accompanied by a large
destroyer had moved up on the port beam of our formation at an initial range
of 16,000 yards which later closed to 12,000 yards and fired very
deliberately full broadsides at the ships of the formation."
0738 Sighted from DE
DENNIS, enemy shell fire is seen to fall 1,000 yards astern of the
carrier group, in sustained fire.
0740 As visibility
permits, DE DENNIS opens fire with her two 5-inch guns on enemy
cruisers and destroyers. The opening range is 15,200 yards.
A/C Aboard DENNIS,
Lieutenant Commander Hansen heard RADM Sprague’s order to the destroyers
to make the torpedo attack. As senior destroyer escort CO, he assumed he
would lead the other DEs in their attack and tried to locate the other DEs
visually to no avail. The entire area was heavily covered by smoke and rain
squalls making visibility very difficult.
0742 Rear Admiral
Sprague urgently orders the "small boys" (destroyers) to form up
and make another torpedo attack on the menacing Japanese heavy cruisers.
Destroyer HOEL, although badly damaged by her encounter with BB KONGO,
leads, closely followed by newly arrived DD HEERMANN, the only
undamaged destroyer remaining.
EVENT Destroyer HEERMANN,
on the south side of the task unit, furthest from the action, turns north to
engage the cruiser line and races through the CVE formation among the
multi-colored shell splashes which continued to fall among the escort
carriers. Destroyer HEERMANN, able to make better than 30 knots,
speeds through the smoke screen and nearly collides with DE ROBERTS,
which is laying smoke between the escort carriers and the Japanese cruiser
column.
A/C The three
destroyers of Taffy III were faced with an overwhelming responsibility this
day. They were practically all that stood between the escort carriers and
VADM Kurita’s Centre Force. They fought so magnificently, It is no wonder
the Japanese had called them "cruisers" in their action reports.
A/C Quoting CVE KITKUN
BAY's Ship's History, "it was an inspiring sight to see those
small, inadequately armed vessels turn without hesitation to attack so
overwhelming a force, which by now had been determined as consisting of six
(actually 4) battleships, seven (actually 6) heavy cruisers, three (actually
2) light cruisers, and ten (actually 11) destroyers...".
A/C After the DDs
(code name Wolves) received their orders to attack the cruisers, ROBERTS
had asked the screen commander in HEERMANN if she were also to join
in. DE ROBERTS was told, "...the Little Wolves will join up for
second attack...." "Little Wolves" was the TBS codeword for
the destroyer escorts of Taffy III.
A/C At this point in
the battle, DE ROBERTS was on the engaged port side of the escort
carrier formation with none of her sister DEs to be found. Lieutenant
Commander Copeland had in fact waited to see if any of the other DEs were
responding to the order to form a second attack. The senior destroyer escort
present was DENNIS. When it appeared no other DEs would reply, he
followed the last destroyer at 3,000 yards astern when it sped past him.
Destroyer escorts, lightly armed, were not trained in group torpedo attack
tactics, their soul purpose being anti-submarine warfare.
| 0745
Rear Admiral Stump’s Taffy II, steaming about 30 miles southeast of
Taffy III, completes launching forty-three Avenger torpedo-bombers and
thirty-six fighter aircraft, which fly toward Taffy III in three waves.
A/C This was the
beginning of Taffy II’s support in the battle.
EVENT With the
range of the Japanese cruisers decreasing steadily, the advancing heavy
cruisers come into range of CVE GAMBIER BAY’s single 5-inch
gun. She opens fire and on the sixth round they hit a heavy cruiser.
Three rounds later, they hit another.
A/C The firing
of their single 5-inch gun was said to be quite the morale booster.
|
Composite
Squadron VC-5 Action Report
USS KALININ BAY (CVE 68)
At about 0740 sight contact was made with four
Japanese cruisers; 2 NACHI class, 2 TONE class; 2
battleships: one a NAGATO, the other a KONGO, and numerous
DDs. Our torpedo planes were at 8000 feet at about 0740 when the signal
was given to attack.
LCDR Keighley picked the second cruiser in line, a TONE
class, as his target in a dive bombing attack. His six centuries
straddled the stern going from the starboard quarter to just aft of
amidships on the port side. Three bombs were direct hits, the others
short or over.
ENS Altman glided down to about 5000 feet and when he was directly
over a NAGATO class BB, he pushed over, firing four 5" SAP
rockets and releasing 2-500 lb. G.P. bombs. The rockets hit directly
amidships causing an explosion and black smoke. The five hundred pound
bombs hit on the port side of the ship, one hitting the bow, the other
about 25 feet out from the bow. LTJG J.E. Merchant attacked a NACHI
type cruiser and straddled it with six centuries, three being direct
hits. |
0743
Destroyer Escort RAYMOND hears RADM Sprague's order to conduct the second
torpedo attack. Her Commanding Officer, LCDR A. F. Beyer believes the order is
meant for his ship also. Destroyer escort RAYMOND is turned northward to
engage the Japanese ships. She chooses CA HAGURO as her target.
| 0744
Three torpedo planes, followed by five bombers attack heavy cruisers' CHIKUMA
and TONE. Both put up heavy anti-aircraft fire and evade by
making wide turns to starboard and port, respectively.
A/C Both ships
carried an increased AA battery of fifty-seven 25mm AA guns.
0746 Heavy
cruiser HAGURO fires on "heavy cruiser" DD JOHNSTON with
her 8-inch batteries. |
RADM C.A.F. Sprague,
USN
Commander TASK UNIT 77.4.3 (Taffy III)
"The Wildcat pilots were given a free hand to strafe, with the
hope that their strafing would kill personnel on the Japanese warships,
silence automatic weapons, and, most important, draw attention from the
struggling escort carriers. Sometimes two, or four Wildcats would join
up for a strafing run. Again, a Wildcat would join up and run
interference for an Avenger. Then, likely as not, it would turn out that
the Avenger had no torpedo or bomb and was simply making a dummy run.
When their ammunition gave out, the fighters also made dry runs to turn
the pursuers." |
EVENT Destroyer
escort ROBERTS, in a good position to respond to RADM Sprague’s
second attack order, follows the larger FLETCHER Class destroyers by
about 3,000 yards astern without orders to join. This ploy is solely the
initiative of DE ROBERTS’ aggressive commanding officer, LCDR
Robert W. Copeland, a Naval Reservist.
EVENT On the
starboard side of the CVE formation, DE BUTLER tries to find senior
DE DENNIS to coordinate the destroyer escort’s ordered torpedo
attack. Her search, for the time being, is in vain.
A/C The heavy
cruisers of Cruiser Division Five, HAGURO and CHOKAI, are the
closest threat to the American destroyers.
0749 Destroyer HEERMANN,
still speeding northward, approaches DD HOEL which, due to her
significant damage, is running at reduced speed. Unaware of DD HOEL’s
limited propulsion, DD HEERMANN closes the distance on DD HOEL
swiftly and has to reverse her engines once again to all-back emergency,
avoiding another collision.
A/C Commander
Hathaway’s adrenaline must have been flowing briskly during these events.
Knowing he would soon be engaging a major portion of the attacking fleet,
his ship, the escort carriers, and the other screening ships were in for the
fight of their lives. The shell splashes, smoke screen, and rain squalls
were a constant distraction and did not make his work any easier for him.
0749 At a range of
17,000 yards, BB HARUNA fires on an American "destroyer" to
starboard.
A/C This
"destroyer" was one of the FLETCHERs or possibly DE ROBERTS.
0750 TBS - v Taffy
3, "ALL SMALL BOYS GO IN AND LAUNCH TORPEDO ATTACK."
0750 Not satisfied
with the progress of second torpedo attack by the escorts, RADM Sprague
orders "EXECUTE".
0750 Destroyer
JOHNSTON exits the rain squall and sights destroyers HOEL, HEERMANN,
and DE ROBERTS conducting the second torpedo attack on an opposite
course. Having expended her torpedoes and also having taken a large amount
of punishment, DD JOHNSTON joins Taffy III's other two destroyers and
DE ROBERTS’ column to provide gunfire support. Due to her extensive
damage, DD JOHNSTON’s three aft 5-inch guns must be operated in
manual mode.
0750 Destroyer
Escort DENNIS receives word for the DEs to conduct a separate torpedo
attack. She turns northwest and approaches the heavy cruiser column.
0750 Escort Carrier KALININ
BAY is hit by the first of several 8-inch shells. More 8-inch shells
follow, doing a considerable amount of damage.
A/C The Japanese
mistakenly used armor piercing shells against the thin-hulled American
ships. Most shells passed through the thin-hulled ships without exploding.
Had they used high-capacity explosive shells, they may have sunk more ships,
and most certainly would have caused more damage and personnel casualties.
During the period 0738 to 0750 many salvo splashes were observed on all
sides of the ST LO, several not more than 50 yards away. It was
reported that there was another CA (heavy cruiser) and several DD
(destroyers) moving up to a position off the starboard quarter. However, no
salvoes were observed from this side at this time.
0750 Orders are
received aboard DE DENNIS to make a torpedo attack with the other
destroyer escorts.
A/C The nearest
Japanese warship to DENNIS was a heavy cruiser, about 18,000 yards
distant. DENNIS began her approach on course 310° T, speed 22 knots,
firing her two 5-inch guns as targets of opportunity presented themselves
through the heavy smoke and rain.
0750 Destroyer
Squadron TEN, CL YAHAGI and her four destroyers, circle under heavy
air attack.
0751 TBS - Taffy
2 v FAMOUS, "AFFIRMATIVE. WE WILL LAUNCH THEM AS SOON AS WE
GET INTO THE WIND. WE HAVE TWO AVENGER WITH FISH. WE WILL LAUNCH THEM IN
ABOUT TWO MINUTES." .... v Taffy 2, "ROGER OUT."
0751 As the distance
between the American screening ships and Battleship Division One decreased,
BB YAMATO opens fire with her secondary battery at a
"cruiser" at 11,500 yards.
A/C Visibility was
still very poor considering the relatively short ranges. The small American
warships were constantly driving in and out of the smoke and pall. The
warship being shot at by YAMATO was either HOEL or HEERMANN.
EVENT Escort Carrier
GAMBIER BAY launches her last plane, without a pilot.
| EVENT
Destroyer HOEL, capable of making just over half of her
original maximum speed, approaches Cruiser Division 5 and fires her five
remaining torpedoes at CA HAGURO. The heavy cruiser is hit by one
of DD HOEL’s torpedoes, greatly contributing to the defense of
the escort carriers.
EVENT While in
the thick of it, DD HOEL’s fire control radar is shot off by BB
KONGO. The Torpedo Officer is forced to mentally solved the fire
control solution on CA HAGURO from atop the mount. His meticulous
efforts result in at least one crucial hit. |
LT Maurice F. Green,
USN
USS HOEL (DD 533)
"With our ten fish fired we decided it was time
to get the hell out of there...This proved impossible because we were
boxed in on all sides by enemy capital ships. We fishtailed and chased
salvos and made all possible speed on one engine which enabled us to
continue to remain afloat...
The Jap battleships were 8000 yards on the port beam. We had heavy
cruisers 7000 yards on the starboard quarter and we had only two guns
left to fire. They were forward which made if difficult to continue
firing while attempting a retirement. These two guns must have expended
250 or 300 rounds each..." |
EVENT After
expending her last torpedoes, DD HOEL is slowed by battle damage.
Under limited propulsion she attempts to retire toward the escort carriers
in the middle of the Japanese "box".
EVENT Restrained by
battleships NAGATO, KONGO, and HARUNA from the rear,
heavy cruisers on her left flank and destroyers on the right, DD HOEL
has nowhere to go and is hit repeatedly with 16-inch, 14-inch, 8-inch, and
5-inch shells.
A/C HOEL was
in a tight entanglement. Her speed was limited to a mere 17 knots by this
time, no match for the Japanese warships. Now flanked on three sides, she
met her demise.
EVENT Struck by over
40 shells, DD HOEL’s engine room is soon flooded and she lists 20
degrees to port. Defiantly her two operational guns remain in action against
her aggressors, firing over 250 rounds each.
0752 Destroyer
Escort DENNIS operates independently and approaches the heavy cruiser
column dodging salvos on her approach.
EVENT Destroyer HEERMANN,
the fittest of the destroyers, engages CA HAGURO and fires 125 5-inch
shells on her approach.
| EVENT
Next in line, DE ROBERTS charges CA CHOKAI at flank
bell, 24 knots, laying a dense smoke screen as she goes. On her approach
she passes DD JOHNSTON retiring in the opposite direction. An
enemy shell, intended for DD JOHNSTON, severs DE ROBERTS’
radio mast antenna which drops onto her sole torpedo tube mount,
temporarily placing it out of commission.
EVENT Battleship
KONGO shifts her fire to DD HEERMANN; 14-inch splashes
land all around her sending walls of water cascading over her bridge.
Behind BB KONGO, battleships' HARUNA, NAGATO and
mammoth YAMATO race forward. Destroyer HEERMANN turns to
engage the battleships. She exchanges fire with the big ships without
being hit. |
LCDR
Robert W. Copeland, USN
Commanding Officer
USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS (DE 413)
"We started on the torpedo attack. I reached over and picked up
the JV telephone and called No. 1 engine room where the chief engineer's
battle station was. That was Lieutenant Trowbridge. In formal
conversation while on a strictly duty status I always called the
officers Mister....in the privacy of the Wardroom, however, we called
him "Lucky"....He answered my call and I said, "Lucky,
this is the Captain....we are going on a torpedo attack and I have rung
up full speed; we are going in at 20 knots. As soon as we fire our fish,
I will ring up flank speed and I want you to hook on everything you've
got. Don't worry about your reduction gears or your boilers or anything,
because there's all hell being thrown at us up here, and we are just
fortunate we haven't been hit yet, so don't worry about it." That
was the last time I ever talked to Mr. Trowbridge because he was lost
with the ship." |
A/C There were so
many close-aboard near misses on HEERMANN, CDR Hathaway was having
trouble seeing over the water geysers which were covering the entire bridge.
HEERMANN was likely the only destroyer to have ever engaged four
battleships singlehandedly and survived. Her success could be attributed to
the confusion of the battle, the smoke screen, rain squalls, her speed, and
low silhouette. Most certainly the battleships did not feel threatened by
her, and most likely ignored her. They were set on searching for bigger
game.
EVENT Presenting a
low silhouette, DE ROBERTS is able to approach to within 4,000 yards
of the Japanese warships unseen. She recovers from the mast and torpedo tube
mount damage, fires her three torpedoes, reverses course, and heads back
toward the escort carriers at an emergency flank bell.
A/C Realizing his
time under the Japanese large caliber guns was suicidal, LCDR Copeland
ordered his engine room to ignore propulsion limits on the journey back to
the escort carriers. Safety valves were secured, allowing steam pressure to
rise to 670 pounds in a plant designed for a maximum of 440. Shaft rpm rose
to 477 on shafts designed for 420. This added push enabled ROBERTS to
obtain a speed of 28 and one-half knots.
A/C The three
American screening ships fired a total of fifteen torpedoes at the advancing
Japanese during this phase of the screening action. Two of the ships, HOEL
and ROBERTS, greatly contributed to the defense of the escort
carriers, each hitting an enemy heavy cruiser with their torpedo attack.
EVENT Heavy cruiser CHOKAI
is hit aft by at least one of DE ROBERTS' torpedoes and she falls out
of formation.
0754 Attaining a
suitable firing position on the Japanese heavy cruiser column, DD HEERMANN
fires seven torpedoes at CA HAGURO. Nine thousand yards distant, and
moving at 25 knots, the Japanese ship evades all seven torpedoes.
0754 TBS - v Taffy
3, "ALL CARRIERS MAKE SMOKE."
0754 TBS - v FIGLEAF,
"TORPEDOES COMING TOWARD CARRIER GROUP ON OUR PORT SIDE." .... v FIGLEAF.
| EVENT
Shortly after firing her torpedoes, DD HEERMANN sighted the
battleships approaching from northward, course 350° T. She turns to
port and proceeds to engage battleships KONGO and HARUNA,
about 9,000 yards distant.
0755 Heavy
cruiser HAGURO concentrates on DE RAYMOND and puts a salvo
200 yards astern of her.
0755 Destroyer HEERMANN
opens fire with her 5-inch guns on BB HARUNA. 0756 Destroyer
escort RAYMOND, on the port side of the CVE formation, approaches CA HAGURO,
fires her three torpedoes from 6,000 yards and misses. Heavy cruiser HAGURO
returns fire, shooting fifteen 8-inch volleys at the small destroyer escort.
All miss. Having expended all of her torpedoes, DE RAYMOND reverses
course and retires towards the escort carriers. |
|
SHIP |
Torpedoes |
Time |
TARGET/RESULTS |
|
Carried |
Fired |
|
HOEL |
10 |
5 |
0742 |
CA HAGURO, 1 hit |
|
HEERMANN |
10 |
7 |
0742 |
CA HAGURO, all miss |
|
ROBERTS |
3 |
3 |
0742 |
CA CHOKAI, 1 hit |
|
RAYMOND |
3 |
3 |
0756 |
CA HAGURO, all miss |
|
DENNIS |
3 |
3 |
0759 |
CA TONE, all miss |
|
HEERMANN |
10 |
3 |
0800 |
BB HARUNA, all miss. However, BB
YAMATO is forced to run north to evade the torpedoes |
|
| Second
screening action results |
0756 An aircraft
from ST LO’s Composite Squadron VC-65 verified the
composition of Centre Force as consisting of, "...four BB
(battleships), eight CA (heavy cruisers) and CL (light cruisers) and many DD
(destroyers)."
0758 Aboard CVE KITKUN
BAY, three destroyers, thought hostile, are reported off the port bow,
bearing 147° T, distance 20,000 yards. Their appearance causes great
concern until they are identified as friendly.
A/C The destroyers
sighted by CVE KITKUN BAY were Taffy II's HAGGARD, HAILEY
and FRANKS. They were operating in the rear of their six escort
carriers, guarding Taffy II's back door.
0758 Destroyer JOHNSTON
continues to effectively engage the heavy cruisers. Heavy cruiser TONE
fires on DD JOHNSTON and logs the action in her deck log as
"fired on heavy cruiser."
0759 At 22 knots,
her maximum speed, DE DENNIS approaches to within four miles of the
heavy cruiser column. 8,000 yards distant, heavy cruisers HAGURO, TONE,
CHOKAI, and CHIKUMA approach. Destroyer escort DENNIS
chooses the second heavy cruiser in line, CA TONE, as her target and
fires her three torpedoes. They all run hot, straight and normal but all
miss. Destroyer escort DENNIS then turns southwest and opens fire on
another cruiser with her number 2 5-inch gun.
A/C The "Little
Wolves" had now executed the secondary torpedo attack ordered earlier
by RADM Sprague. Although DENNIS and RAYMOND failed to score
any hits during their torpedo attacks, they helped significantly by forcing HAGURO
and TONE to take their focus away from the escort carriers.
A/C DENNIS’
torpedo firing course was 270° T. The second torpedo was fired 20 seconds
after the first, and the third torpedo five seconds after the second.
0759 Heavy cruiser TONE,
second in line in the advancing cruiser column is hit forward by taffy
aircraft. The resulting fires cause her to momentarily drop out of line. She
brings the fires under control and rejoins the cruiser column behind CA CHIKUMA
with little loss of ground.
| 0800
Destroyer HEERMANN at 4,400 yards, fires her remaining three
torpedoes at BB HARUNA. The torpedoes miss BB HARUNA, but
BB YAMATO, in the line of fire, is forced to reverse course and
run north for 10 miles to avoid DD HEERMANN's torpedo tracks.
A/C This action
was perhaps the most fortunate event of the entire battle. It placed BB YAMATO's
big guns, along with VADM Kurita's command and control, out of
communication with the forward elements of Centre Force for the
remainder of the action. From the Japanese point of view, YAMATO’s
performance in the Battle Off Samar was disappointing. Her large
18.1-inch guns, the largest in the world, failed to sink any ships
outright. |
CDR Amos T. Hathaway,
USN
Commanding Officer
USS HEERMANN (DD 532)
"After we fired our last three torpedoes at the enemy
battleship, I went inside the pilot house, called the admiral (Sprague)
on the TBS and told him my exercise was completed. I don’t know quite
why I used those words. I remember having an idea in my head that the
Japs might be listening in on the circuit and I didn’t want them to
know that I didn’t have any more torpedoes. I don’t believe that the
admiral understood me either, as a little while later they asked me if I
had any torpedoes left." |
0800 TBS - Taffy
33 v JUGGERNAUGHT, "MY FISH ARE OFF."
EVENT With all ten
of her torpedoes expended, DD HEERMANN reverses course and heads back
to the starboard quarter of the escort carrier formation to lay more smoke.
EVENT Taffy III's
Avengers hit CA HAGURO and put her #2 turret out of action. Harried
and damaged, heavy cruisers HAGURO and CHOKAI of Cruiser
Division Five fall back.
EVENT Heavy cruisers
CHIKUMA and TONE, the most fit of the remaining ships of
Cruiser Division Seven, now take the lead and concentrate their fire on the
fleeing escort carriers.

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