Enemy Strategy

1. Since the time the U.S. Navy recovered from the Pearl Harbor attack and outgrew the Japanese navy in size and effectiveness, the enemy naval strategy could only follow one general plan: to successively concentrate overwhelming forces against well-separated parts of our fleet which became exposed.

2. The tactics which resulted in the events of 25 October 1944 followed just such a plan. The plan was daring and boldly carried out. Japanese naval forces departed from Singapore, Borneo, Celebes, and Formosa bases at such times as would permit them to arrive in the Philippine area on the evening of 24 October 1944. One group of ships, probably composed of 2 BB, 4 or more CA and numerous destroyers was to sortie through Surigao Strait and enter Leyte Gulf from the south. A second force probably composed of 6 BB, 8 CA, and 13 or more DD was to transit San Bernardino Straits and proceed to the south and enter Leyte Gulf from the northeast. These two groups were to operate together to destroy all U.S. shipping in Leyte Gulf. To allow this plan to succeed the Japanese had to remove the certainty of too heavy an air attack while making their final approach. They know definitely the size and composition and operations areas of the three groups of CVE's which were operating to the eastward of Leyte and Samar because each group had been scouted by enemy planes at least once during the previous five days. These ships were to be nullified by shore-based air attack, including suicide crash dives on the carrier decks. The existence of a special group of suicide pilots had been indicated in previous intelligence information and it is thought this group was organized with the specific objective of wiping out the local carrier based air strength with cold-blooded certainty. As for the fast carrier groups, there are two possible lines of Japanese thought. One, that they believed a large part of their own claims of damage to the U.S. Fleet following the strikes on Formosa, and that their force sent down from the north was intended to be large enough to contain the remnant U.S. forces. But it is considered far more probable that the Jap high command had a very realistic conception of the remaining strength (and approximate position) of the THIRD FLEET and that the Jap northern force was not meant to be of sufficient strength to defeat our fast carriers and battleships in battle. It was purely a diversion force to entice the THIRD FLEET out of range of interference with the Leyte operation. The fact that it had only one CV indicates that it was not an all-out carrier effort on the part of the Japanese, and furthermore, there is no logical reason to suppose that the Japs should suddenly reverse their previous strategy and of their own volition elect to come cut and exchange carrier air blows on the high seas. The presence in this northern force of 2 BB was designed to render the morsel sufficiently attractive to the THIRD FLEET to warrant pursuit by our fast BBV and their subsequent elimination from the situation being created at Leyte Gulf. This northern Jap force had as its objective the drawing of the THIRD FLEET to the north for a period of twelve to twenty-four hours, and undoubtedly intended to retire at full speed as soon as they could be sure our main body of carriers and battleships was in pursuit.

3. By these strategems the Japs have eliminated all major threats of air or surface interference for the daylight period necessary to accomplish their objective; they have decisive air superiority from shore fields, and they can bring overwhelming surface superiority to bear in the Leyte Gulf trap. After the completion of the slaughter, they undoubtedly intended to withdraw through Surigao Strait, where it is possible a CV (subsequently sunk) was waiting to provide air cover for their return to base. The presence of several enemy submarines on our own retirement route from Leyte to the southwest indicated that the Japs had taken measures to deal with our cripples attempting to reach Woendi, Manus or Kossol Straits.

4. The plan was well conceived and so well executed that it came dangerously close to succeeding. Concealment or surprise were not achieved, nor were they essential providing the bulk of the heavy ships arrived intact. It was essential that the THIRD FLEET be removed from the opposition, even though some losses had to be accepted to accomplish this, and this part of the plan apparently worked on schedule, including the losses.

5. As to why the main Jap plan failed, there are the following concrete reasons.

(a) The losses and damage sustained by the southern group and the failure of any of them to force the Surigao Straits.

(b) The losses and damage sustained by Jap forces enroute to the Philippine area from our submarines.

(c) The losses and damage sustained from CVE air attack.

(d) The poor timing of the suicide squadron in locating and crippling the CVE's and thus preventing further damage from our air attack.

(e) And very fundamentally, the decision of the Jap commander to retreat at the time he did.

6. It is not too difficult to surmise with some accuracy the contributory reasons why the Jap OTC made the very poor decision of breaking off the action with the CVE's and withdrawing the same way he came. From our viewpoint, this decision seems to be the only sure factor which made the difference between success and failure for the Japs. Had this decision not been made, the Jap main body could have, and should have, waded through and completed the destruction of this Task Unit, and continuing to the south, would have found our naval opposition very low on ammunition following their night action. In Leyte Gulf, they could have successfully accomplished their mission and retired through Surigao Straits as was originally intended. During this time, they would have been exposed to only minor damage from weakened CVE air attacks (whose largest bomb was 500-pound SAP) plus belated air strikes from Task Group 38.1 which were going to occur anyway. Factors which are believed to have influenced the OTC of the Jap fleet in his decisions were as follows:

(a) The information that his southern force had been repulsed; if his communication channels were as clogged as ours there is a good reason to believe he would be getting sufficient information of this situation to evaluate it.

(b) The fact that he was under continuous air attack coupled with the fact that his plans included definite interruption of CVE air attack by suicide dive bombers may have led him to believe that he was under air attack from other than CVE's. If such was the case, the pursuit and destruction of T.U. 77.4.3 did not justify the damage he would receive from such air attack, and placed the success of his surface action in Leyte Gulf in serious doubt. To support this theory, he had a small advance force of 3 DD well to the southeast which made visual contact with T.U. 77.4.2 (6 CVE's, 3 DD's, 4 DE's) and he may well have received a false or alarming contact report from these scouts.

(c) The fact that all CVE's in T.U. 77.4.3 were seen to be straddled repeatedly and were all smoking copiously may have caused him to think that they were more seriously damaged than they actually were and promoted the decision that a continued pursuit to the kill was needless.

(d) He himself was behind schedule, possibly due to air attack the previous afternoon. He probably should have arrived off Leyte Gulf before dawn, completed the bombardment by noon and departed the area before our heavy forces could be recalled from their activity to the northward. It seems reasonable that he intended to withdraw west of the Philippines under cover of darkness the night of the 25th, and it was essential that he place the land barrier of the islands between himself and the returning U.S. heavy forces.