Own Strategy

1. There was ample information of the mustering of the Jap naval forces and their position, speed, and direction of movement to enable U.S. commanders to estimate the situation with good accuracy. Enclosure (D) gives a tabulation of contact reports and the appended chart shows a plot of contacts with major enemy units, as the Jap plan unfolded.

2. After the air attack upon the northern group of enemy heavy ships by T.G. 38.3 on the afternoon of the 24th, it became quite clear that this group might attempt to sortie through San Bernardino Straits. This possibility was so apparent that there did not seem to be any reasonable doubt that our own forces would fail to guard the eastern mouth of the Straits, prevent the sortie of enemy units, and give timely notice of the enemy's attempt.

3. When the enemy attack by the southern force through Surigao Straits developed, the question of the whereabouts of the enemy northern component became even larger and more formidable. This unit had never been assigned any responsibility for covering the exit of San Bernardino Straits, either by reconnaissance or by force, and in the absence of any information that this exit was no longer blocked, it was logical to assume that our northern flank could not be exposed without ample warning.

4. Had this T.U. had any reason to suspect that an enemy sortie could be made through San Bernardino Straits undetected by other U.S. forces, a search to the northwest would have been launched from a more easterly position, and it is possible that a direct surface action could have been avoided.

5. As it was, the only warning came from an Anti-Sub-Patrol TBM who reported being fired upon by a large group of enemy ships to the northward. This warning came when the enemy main body was only about 17 miles away, closing very rapidly on a nearly opposite course, and only shortly before major caliber shells began to fall in our midst. From this point on, it was a question of extracting the 6 CVE's, 3 DD's, and 4 DE's from a situation frought with disaster.

6. The success attendant upon the efforts to escape the devastating enemy fire was remarkable almost to the point of being unexplainable. After being under enemy fire for two and one half hours at ranges closing to under 10,500 yards, this Task Unit lost one carrier, and two DD's and one DE. These escorts were lost as a result of their heroic torpedo attack into the center of the enemy under very heavy fire. U.S.S. ST. LO (Ex MIDWAY) was lost sometime later after the enemy had begun retirement as a result of a successful suicide dive into the middle of her flight deck and subsequent explosions. From almost the beginning of the action, heavy funnel and FS smoke was laid by all vessels; this, together with a providential rain squall, seemed to bother the enemy fire control parties to an unusual degree, resulting at times in lulls in the firing, and perhaps indicating lack of use of radar fire control for surface gunnery.

The Japanese gunnery was good as to mean range, poor as to advance range, and with excellent patterns. It is believed they had an airborne spotter overhead. The fact that a large number of shells were AP, non-explosive, resulted in much loss damage from hits received. In summation, the failure of the enemy main body and encircling light forces to completely wipe out all vessels of this Task Unit can be attributed to our successful smoke screen, our torpedo counter-attack, continuous harassment of enemy by bomb, torpedo, and straffing air attacks, timely maneuvers, and the definite partiality of Almighty God.