Surface Action Against the Enemy

1. The events of the morning of the 25th of October proceeded along routine lines from midnight until 0645. Sunrise was to be at 0614. The sea was calm with 6 to 8 knots of wind from a northeasterly direction. About three tenths cumulous clouds were present with widely scattered showers. At 0530, the Target Combat Air Patrol of 12 VF had been launched, and at 0607 the Support Group of 4 VT, Target Anti-Sub Patrol of 2 VT, plus local Combat Air Patrol and local Anti-Submarine Patrol had been launched. All target missions had departed for the target area. At 0645, AA gunfire was observed, and two minutes later an anti-sub patrol plane reported he was being fired upon by an unidentified group of BB and CA bearing 340 degrees distant about 20 miles. Course was immediately changed to 090, which was close enough to the wind to permit launching and still avoid further closing of the contact, and flank speed ordered.

2. Subsequent changes of course are shown on the appended track chart and will not be repeated in this narrative. In general, a retirement to the southwest was sought while still avoiding enemy encirclement, in the hope that surface support might be obtained from 7th Fleet forces in Leyte Gulf.

3. At 0657, commenced launching all available aircraft with orders to attack the enemy fleet. Order given to all ships to commence smoking, which was promptly obeyed and with good effect.

4. At 0701, an urgent contact report was broadcast on 2096 kilocycles, plain language, voice, giving our position and bearing and distance of the enemy. Assistance was requested.

5. At 0706, the enemy was closing with disconcerting rapidity, and volume and accuracy of fire was increasing. At this point, it did not appear that any of our ships could survive another five minutes of the heavy caliber fire being received, and some counteraction was urgently and immediately required. The Task Unit was surrounded by the ultimate of desperate circumstances. All escorts were ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes. At this time, direct view of the enemy was obscured by smoke and results of our escorts attack could not be ascertained, but it is believed that, regardless of hits, they succeeded in turning the battleships away at least momentarily, and created a diversion of immense value.

6. About this time we intercepted a fairly heavy rain squall and while in it changed course to the right. The combination of rain and smoke made visibility very poor and enemy fire slackened and fell off in accuracy.

7. Now it became apparent that the enemy had split up and was advancing two heavy cruisers upon our port quarter to encircle our disposition and cut off our retreat. These two heavy cruisers eventually succeeded in advancing almost abeam of us and closing range at will. Eight and five inch salves from this advanced wing were delivered from ranges as low as 10,000 yards and resulted in many straddles and many hits. All available aircraft were diverted to this threat and bomb hits were obtained.

Our 5"-38 return fire was reaching these heavy cruisers and some hits were being scored. But notwithstanding our desperate efforts, the CA fire was practically continuous and so effective that eventual destruction of all of our ships seemed inevitable.

8. Numerous colored splashes were seen from dye-loaded projectiles, and the splashes were very distinctive. Green, red, and possibly yellow were observed.

9. At 0750, FANSHAW BAY was hit forward, and again at 0758, also forward.

10. At 0800, a group of three destroyers were seen approaching from the southeast. They failed to answer visual challenge and later joined the two enemy CA on our port hand as the latter began retirement. These DD are thought to be advance pickets of the enemy northern force, although it is possible they were escaping remnants of the enemy southern force who succeeded in getting through Surigao Strait. In either case, it is believed that it was this force that took T.U. 77.4.2 under fire briefly.

11. At 0824, four escorts had rejoined after their torpedo attack. The last seen of USS JOHNSTON was at the time she was making a torpedo attack between the enemy cruisers (plane report). The last report of USS ROBERTS was from a pilot who said she had been badly hit and was sinking. The last report from USS HOEL was that she had an 8-foot hole at the water line and was stopping to make repairs.

12. At 0824, USS GAMBIER BAY reported she had been hard hit and had lost the use of one engine. She dropped astern and was reported by pilots to have Seen sunk at very close range by enemy cruisers.

13. At 0920, enemy destroyer began a fast approach from the Starboard quarter of the disposition, and at approximately 10,000 yards fired a large number of torpedoes, turning away immediately in a typical destroyer torpedo attack. The torpedoes paralleled our course and were nearly expended by the time they reached the center of our disposition. No hits resulted.

14. As nearly as it can be determined, the enemy issued a retirement order at about 0325; the cruisers to port counter-marched at 0923 and the range to the main body began to open.

15. At 1050, a series of suicide crash-dives by Jap dive bombers began while we were attempting to land aircraft. Those planes never showed as bogeys on the radar screen, and it is thought that they approached from very low altitude, climbed, very rapidly inside SK range, and began their dives from 5 to 6 thousand feet. In all, there were eight of these dive bombers who attacked the five remaining CVE's. One crashed into the middle of the ST. LO's flight deck, appeared to penetrate the flight deck, and started a tremendous fire. This fire resulted shortly afterwards in a tremendous explosion thought to have been caused by torpedoes and bombs stowed on the hangar deck. There were several other explosions accompanied by intense fire, and survivors could be seen abandoning ship. The ST. LO sank without further enemy action.

The KALININ BAY received a crash dive on her flight deck, but without penetration because the pilot appeared to pull out just before hitting. Two other dives on KALININ BAY resulted in near misses. The WHITE PLAINS and FANSHAW BAY each received damage from one near miss by suicide pilots, and the KITKUN BAY suffered two attacks with minor damage.

16. Shortly after this, a second strike of TBM's was launched from KITKUN BAY and WHITE PLAINS which were the only two carriers still capable of launching TBM's.

17. All escorts were ordered to standby ST. LO and the area of battle to rescue survivors. This desperate expedient which left the Task Unit without any screen for the next eight hours was made necessary by the absence of any rescue effort from other sources. It was not until about 2000, the evening of the 25th, when rendezvous was made with Task Unit 77.4.1 that additional screening vessels were obtained, and at this time our ships were already being stalked by an enemy surfaced submarine.

18. During the continued retirement to the southeast, air strike groups from both HORNET and WASP who had apparently missed contact with the retreating enemy force were intercepted by radio and vectored to their objective.

19. As we headed towards a rendezvous with Task Unit 77.4.1, straggler aircraft were recovered from this and other units. Until final reports are received from the Leyte fields, an accurate estimate of our losses in pilots and planes cannot be made.

20. On the basis of incomplete reports received to date, the following is the best estimate of damage inflicted by aircraft and ships gunfire of Task Unit 77.4.3 on 25 October 1944. No reports have been received from three of six squadrons attached to this unit, nor have any reports been received from screening forces.

(a) FANSHAW BAY (CVE 70)

(1) DAMAGED: By aircraft, one CA from left flank of Japanese Fleet with torpedo hit about 30 feet from stern. Large explosion followed and ship was seen to turn in tight circle, trailing oil. This CA initially damaged in this attack was probably sunk by later attacks. Position of attack: Lat. 120 43' N - Long. 1250 42' E.

(2) Damaged: By ships 5"38 gun. Three hits scored on CA, Tone Class from left flank of Japanese Fleet which had closed to about 10,000 yards off port beam of FANSHAW BAY.

(b) WHITE PLAINS (CVE 66)

(1) Probably Sunk: By aircraft: One BB or CA in Mindanac Sea off Bohoi Island left dead in water, burning fiercely and crew abandoning ship. This ship was probably crippled from engagement with Task Group 77.2 the previous night.

(2) Damaged: By aircraft: One CA of Mogami or Tone Class torpedoed about 8 miles off Samar. Ship was left dead in the water. Pilot observed about eight hits on this ship from 5" shells from guns of Task Unit 77.4.3.

(c) KITKUN BAY (CVE 71)

(1) Sunk: One CA by aircraft with four 500 Ib. bomb hits aft of bridge, one 500 Ib. hit·on stern, and one near miss off starboard bow. Attack made unassisted and pilot observed ship to blow up and sink.

(2) Probably sunk: One CA Tone Class with two torpedo hits. Two hits or near misses with 500 Ib. bombs off starboard bow. Cruiser of this class was seen on its side four hours after this attack.

(3) Damaged: One CA, Nachi Class, with one torpedo hit.