The ST LO came through the surface action with the Japanese task force, on the morning of 25 October 1944, with no material casualties, and with three minor personnel casualties, resulting from shrapnel wounds.

At some time after 1020 condition watches were set in order to allow personnel, who had been under concentrated fire since before 0700, to get coffee and a chance to relax. At this time all enemy surface units were off the screen and reported retiring northward, and there were no bogies.

After the enemy surface forces withdrew, one VT plane, which had been armed with a torpedo during the action, was launched in accordance with orders from CTU 77.4.3, with instructions to join a similarly loaded VT from the KITKUN BAY and attack the retiring enemy force. The ST LO was then directed to take on planes from any ship, as several flight decks were out of commission. One VF plane from the KALININ BAY, two VT from the WHITE PLAINS, and two ST LO VT were landed on board. All three VT planes were immediately struck below to expedite rearming with torpedoes and refueling. The KALININ BAY VF and one ST LO VF were also below and the flight deck clear, ready for further landings.

At about 1047, AA fire was seen and heard forward and General Quarters was sounded. At about that same time, numerous planes, believed to include both friendly and enemy, were seen at 1000-3000 feet ahead and on the starboard bow. These planes moved aft to starboard and one of them, when about abeam to starboard, went into a right turn toward the ST LO. After starboard guns opened on him, but with no apparent effect. This plane - a Zeke with a bomb under each wing - continued his right turn into the groove - - and approached over the ramp at very high speed. After crossing the ramp at not over fifty feet, he appeared to push over sufficiently to hit the deck at about number 5 wire. There was a tremendous crash and flash of an explosion as one or both bombs exploded. The plane continued up the deck leaving fragments strewn about and its remnants went over the bow.

On observing the start of this plane's turn toward the ship, I had put the rudder right 25 degrees, and the ship was going into a sharp right turn when the plane hit on deck.

My first impression was that no serious damage had been suffered. There was a hole in the flight deck with smoldering edges which sprang into flame. Hoses were immediately run out from both sides of the flight deck and water started on the fire. Then I noticed that smoke was coming through the hole from below, and that smoke was appearing on both sides of the ship, evidently coming from the hangar. I tried to contact the hangar for a report, but was unable to do so. Within one to one and one-half minutes an explosion occurred on the hangar deck, which puffed smoke and flame through the hole in the deck and, I believe, bulged the flight deck near and aft of the hole. This was followed in a matter of seconds by a much more violent explosion, which rolled back a part of the flight deck bursting through aft of the original hole. The next heavy explosion tore out more of the flight deck and also blew the forward elevator out of its shaft. At this time, which I estimate as still shortly before 1100, I decided that the ship could not be saved. With the smoke and flame, I was even uncertain as to whether the after part still was on the ship, though later I had glimpses of it. All communication was lost, except the sound-powered phones, which apparently were in for some time although I could not get any reports from aft.

The word was passed "stand by to abandon ship" and the order given to stop all engines. The order to the engines appeared to get through, and the word to stand by to abandon ship reached all parts of the ship, partly by sound-powered phone and partly by word of mouth, and the personnel assembled largely on the flight deck forward and on the forecastle. During this time, some personnel had been blown overboard, and some had been driven over by fire. There were numerous acts of heroism, and the wounded were aided by their shipmates in notable manner.

As soon as I considered the ship sufficiently near to dead in the water, I gave the order to abandon ship. During the interval, rafts were being cleared and abandon ship lines readied by the personnel awaiting the final word. At the order "abandon ship", personnel went down the lines and either got into or hung onto rafts or floated with the aid of their life jackets. The wounded were lowered from the forecastle in large numbers. The main groups had left the ship within five to ten minutes after the word was given. The bridge personnel were given the word by me to leave the bridge, leaving myself, Lt. Comdr. Centner (Air Officer), and Neale, buglemaster, on the bridge. Counting the explosion which occurred when the plane contacted the deck as #1, I believe there were eight major explosions before the ship disappeared beneath the surface.

The three remaining bridge personnel descended to the gun gallery after explosion #6, which was particularly violent. Lt. Comdr. Centner actually followed me down the outside ladder, as I had lost track of him in the last explosion and thought he had gone ahead of me. Neale said he had my raft with him and I sent him over the side with it from alongside the island, telling him to make use of it. Centner and I moved forward on the starboard gun gallery and I watched the last few people go over. An enlisted man was attempting to get a line around a badly burned man to lower him to the water. He gave him a hand getting the man over, but he was so limp that after he was part way down he slipped through the line and fell to the water. The enlisted man then went down another line to try to help him, and I went forward to check on the last few people over. Lt. Comdr. Centner stayed with me, and when it appeared that there were no more personnel to go, he went on down a line and I followed shortly after. At some time during this period when we were forward, explosion #7 occurred -- very violent, and throwing much large debris.

After entering the water, I found that I left the ship's side without effort. I saw Captain Artemus Shell, U.S. Army, still holding to a line, apparently calm, and equipped with a kapok jacket. At the time, I was sure he was all right. He was later recovered dead. There was an enlisted man on another line farther aft who seemed worried and I tried to call a raft to him. However, several people reported him as swimming around and I believe he was picked up safely.

I estimate that I was in the water between five and ten minutes when the ship sank at about 1123. When I left, she had a heavy list to port, but either as a result of explosion #7 or #8, (which occurred after I was in the water), it appears that the bottom at the starboard side of the explosion area was blown out, and she finally turned over to starboard and went down by the stern. I believe explosion #8 may well have been the main bomb stowage, as it was very violent and strewed fragments of the ship's structure over a wide area. It is very possible that a number of casualties may have been caused by fragments after people had reached the water safely.

I noted three underwater explosions after the ship disappeared, one being heavy and the other two appearing light. However, no one in my vicinity appeared to have been injured by these blasts.

I swam to and hung onto a raft loaded with personnel and was picked up very soon by the U.S.S. HEERMANN, having been in the water less than an hour.

Separate report will be made on the excellent performance of the rescue vessels.

F. J. MC KENNA,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding, U.S.S. ST. LO.