Scheduled flights had been launched at 0500 by some ships of T.U. 77.4.3, of which ST LO was a component. ST LO had no scheduled flights at that time. At 0530 two VT took off for TASP (Leyte Gulf area), and four VT for LASP over T.U. 77.4.3. At approximately 0620 secure was sounded from morning G.Q. The weather was spotty, with scattered, fairly extensive, rain squalls, and considerable haziness.

At about 0650, an LASP plane reported contact with a large enemy surface force including BB's and cruisers, and almost immediately thereafter visual contact was made from the signal and open bridges. General Quarters was sounded on the first report of contact. The visibility was very poor, but with the unit on course 090 T the pagoda-like masts of the BB's could be unmistakably seen astern. I believe the first report from C.I.C. after the force was picked up on their screen was "30,000, closing". C.T.U. 77.4.3 ordered all aircraft launched immediately for attack, and this order was complied with, four VT and fifteen VF being launched at this time.

During the launching the range of the enemy main body closed rapidly to 25,000 yards and on down to 22,000, and main battery salvoes, from both BB's and CA's, had been landing among the CVE's of the unit since very shortly after the first visual contact. Many straddles and near-straddles (missing only slightly in deflection) were noted, on the ST LO and on other ships of the formation, but no hits were observed during the early phases. As the enemy continued to close and to come up on the northward side, the task unit commander changed course to the right, in two or more increments, to 180 T, at about 0730, and a little later on to 240 T, to avoid remaining for long periods on a steady course. At about 0730 he directed the screen to attack with torpedoes, and this order was carried out in a most heroic manner, the attack being pressed to very close range. The ROBERTS is believed to have been sunk during this attack.

All ships were making maximum smoke and the CVE's were firing their single 5" guns. The ST LO's 5" claimed three direct hits on a CA 14,000 yards astern. Meantime, a CA, accompanied by a large destroyer, had moved up on the port beam of our formation at an initial range of 16,000 yards, which was later closed to 12,000, and fired, very deliberately, full broadsides at the ships for the formation. It was reported that there was another CA in a similar position to starboard, but possibly due to smoke and haze, I was unable to see this ship. However, I did not observe any evidence of salvoes coming from that direction. After a considerable period, estimated to be about 0820, the GAMBIER BAY reported being heavily hit, and that she had lost one engine. She rapidly dropped aft, where she undoubtedly came under the fire of the enemy main body, and was not seen again. About this time the ships of the screen were ordered to shift from the starboard to the port side of the formation. At about this time, also, the HOEL apparently dropped back and was not seen again.

A group believed to consist of one CL and eight DD's were observed closing from the starboard quarter shortly after this time (probably between 0830 and 0845) and also at this time the KALININ BAY turned quite sharply right passing astern of the ST LO and then came back to course after shifting from my port to my starboard quarter. The group on the starboard quarter closed to about 7,000 yards and considerable fire was noted, presumably 4.7". From the splashes it appeared that the KALININ BAY was their primary target, with the ST LO also receiving considerable attention. The ST LO was repeatedly straddled at this time by (apparently) 4.7" coming from a ship or ships which had closed under cover of smoke on her port quarter. The group on the starboard quarter after closing to under 7,000 yards, reversed course, but after opening the range reversed again and closed again to about 7,000 yards, firing steadily, then made a final reversal and pulled away. It is believed that full salvoes of torpedoes were fired on the last run (about 0910).

At shortly after 0920 (estimated), it was seen that the two ships on the port beam, which had been firing steadily, though slowly, throughout this time, were reversing course. As the CA retired she fired a few last salvoes. At this time 88 (?) Derby, Lieutenant Waldrop, one of the VT who had been launched at the beginning of the action called and reported torpedoes approaching from the starboard quarter, and shortly thereafter a number of them were porpoising. Lieutenant Waldrop strafed one which exploded in the wake of the KALININ BAY. Another exploded a short distance on the port quarter of the ST LO. The wakes were quite numerous and the porpoising so continuous that both the ST LO and KALININ BAY attempted to explode the torpedoes with 40mm and 20mm fire. No success was attained and it is believed that more harm than good is caused by this practice, as it makes it difficult for the CO's to see the courses of the torpedoes clearly and attempt to comb the wakes.

The avoidance of the torpedo barrage closed the surface action. The ST LO suffered no structural damage. Three men received superficial wounds from flying shrapnel.

During the action, the calm and coolness of the officers and crew was worthy of remark.

The 40mm and 20mm crews were directed to take cover nearby their guns from shrapnel, and the word passed to see that all hands had their life jackets on or at hand. The Communications Officer, Disbursing Officer, Navigator, and others concerned were prepared to take any necessary action on their publications. There was no indication of excitement.

F. J. MC KENNA,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding, U.S.S. ST. LO.